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Chapter I Introduction 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe has undergone significant change in 
the last decade. Between 1985 and 1990, the stock of Japanese FDI directed to Europe 
increased more than five times, and the annual flow of new investment grew from about 
$2 billion to over $14 billion. Europe's share of Japan's total FDI also increased 
substantially. However, with the end of the 'bubble economy', new investment in Europe 
fell sharply. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the trends in Japanese FDI in Europe in the 
context of Japanese FDI worldwide. The thesis will analyse the reasons for and 
implications of these trends. In addition, attention will be given to the attitudes towards 
this investment and the resulting conflicts, and prospects for the future. 
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical basis for this analysis. It provides a definition of direct 
investlnent, and an outline of the reasons why a business might invest and the necessary 
conditions for investment to be profitable. The explanation of the factors which 
determine the direction of direct investment is used later in the thesis to analyse the 
geographical distribution of Japan's FDI. Chapter 2 also gives a general discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of FDI for the host country. This discussion is 
ubsequently used as background for the analysis of conflicting attitudes towards 
J apane e FDI in Europe. 
Many of the reasons for the boom and subsequent decline of Japanese FDI in Europe 
coincide with the rea on for the similar pattern in total Japanese FDI. Therefore, the 
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trends in Japanese FDI in Europe need to be examined in the context of changes in 
Japane e FDI worldwide. Chapter 3 provides this context. 
Until the 1970s, Japanese FDI was limited as a result of strict government controls and a 
shortage of capital with balance of payments deficits the norm. The late 1970s brought 
the liberalisation of capital markets and an increasingly international orientation for 
Japane e firms. With ever increasing trade surpluses, the Japanese sought to correct the 
imbalance with capital outflow, and Japan became the world's largest capital exporter 
(until 1993 when it slipped back to third position). 
The increase in total Japanese FDI was particularly remarkable in the period between 
1986 and 1991. As a result, the topic was the subject of much attention and mixed 
elnotions fron1 politicians, the media and academics alike. With the end of the 'bubble 
economy', investment has returned to more normal levels. 
Coinciding with the increase in the total amount of Japanese FDI, there have been clear 
shifts in the geographical and sectoral patterns of that investment. Particularly noticeable 
in recent years have been the increasing amount and proportiqn directed toward 
industrialised countries, reflecting what Balassa and Noland 1 claim to be "changing 
n1otivations". Japanese FDI in Europe needs to be considered in the context of these 
changing motivations and investment in industrialised countries . Some of the reasons for 
the inve tment boom in Europe are corrunon to the United States and Australia. 
I Balassa, B. and Noland , M ., Japan in the World Economy, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC, 1988, p. 118. 
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However, Japanese FDI in Europe has increased more rapidly than that in other 
industrialised countries indicating that there are some factors unique to Europe. There 
has been significant discussion of these factors. One of the most important is the 
establishment of the European Union (EU) (previously known as the European 
Community (EC)) and the single European market. To provide the background to this 
analysis, Chapter 4 briefly outlines the history and development of the EU. It also 
outlines the political and economic relationships between Europe and Japan. These have 
had important influences on the amount of Japanese FDI directed to Europe. 
Chapter 5 draws on the context provided by the earlier chapters to analyse the shifts in 
Japanese FDI to Europe and the reasons for those movements. It also analyses the 
distribution of Japanese investment in Europe with respect to countries and sectors. 
These di tributions are analysed in the context of the 'intra-regional division of labour' 
model as discussed by Morris-Suzuki in Morris2. This analysis also provides clear 
illustration of the factors influencing the direction of Japanese FDI, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
Chapter 5 also examines the widely contrasting attitudes and policies toward Japanese 
FDI from different countries and groups within Europe. These result from the conflicting 
advantages and disadvantages that FDI brings to the host countries. The contrasting 
po ition within Europe have provided new conflicts both between and within the 
countrie of the EU. 
2 Morris , J (ed.), Japan and the global economy: issues and trends in the 1990s, Routledge, London , 
1991, pp. 10-1 1. 
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The topic of Japanese FDI in Europe is of interest to other industrialised countries for 
two main rea ons. Fir t, there are similarities and differences between the problems and 
conflicts facing the European with regard to Japanese FDI, and the situation in other 
indu trialised countries. An analysis of European conflicts provides the basis to compare 
and contra t. 
Second, Japanese FDI in Europe has important implications for other industrialised 
countrie , particularly the United States. The Americans are competing for Japanese 
investment headed to Europe. They are also facing increased competition, both at home 
and in third markets, from European-produced, Japanese-owned exports. 
The story of Japanese investment in Europe provides an interesting setting for the 
growing Asian economies that in the coming decades will follow Japan's footsteps in 
pushing into the European market. Both the Asian countries and the Europeans have 
Ie son to learn from the EU-Japan relationship. 
Chapter 6 considers the future prospects for Japanese FDI in Europe in the context of 
change in FDI worldwide. Specific attention is given to Eur9pean unification and the 
problems that have arisen, the proposed expansion of the EU, and the effect of these 
factors on Japanese FDI in Europe. Future prospects for Japanese investment are of vital 
importance to the econon1ies of western Europe still coming out of recession, and to the 
countrie of Eastern Europe who hope that Japanese FDI will provide the catalyst for 
growth. 
Thi the i direct mo t of it attention to Japanese investment in the EU. However, the 
EU i a rapidly changing entity. It size, form and motivation are very different to those 
of the original six that signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and formed the European 
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Economic Community (EEC). Many countries have applied for membership or are 
undertaking internal debate to determine if joining the Union is appropriate. Therefore, in 
addition to analysing Japanese FDI in the EU, a wider view of Europe is taken to give 
consideration to Japanese investment in the other nations of western Europe. In some 
cases, the tern1S EU and Europe are used interchangeably. 
The third level of interest is in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. While these countries have expressed interest in joining the Union, the chances of 
thi in the short term are remote. Their economies and societies are very different to 
those of the rest of Europe, and they are in the process of difficult restructuring. 
However, there is potential for strong growth in Japanese FDI to these countries, and 
Chapter 6 gives some consideration to the prospects for Japanese investment there. 
-1 0-
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Chapter 2. Characteristics of Foreign Direct Investment 
2.1 Definition of direct investment 
Foreign investment is generated by a surplus of savings over investment, or equivalently 
the difference between exports (and other current receipts) and imports (and other 
current payments). This surplus results in an outflow of capital. Foreign investment can 
take one of two forms - portfolio or direct investment. 
Portfolio investment is that in which the ownership of assets is transferred. This includes, 
for example, investment in public issues of shares and debentures. Portfolio investment 
tends to be more volatile than direct investment in response to economic conditions. 
Direct inve tment is defined as that which transfers control of the use of assets. It is 
investment in branches and subsidiaries. It can take the form of acquisition of securities, 
provision of loans or the establishment and expansion of overseas branches. Direct 
investment flows can be independent of overall capital flows. "Direct investment requires 
more intin1ate contact and knowledge than portfolio investment. II For this reason it has 
tended to be concentrated in countries that have similar econonuc and social conditions to 
tho e fron1 where the investment originated. Otherwise a large investment in knowledge 
is required) 
Thi the i will concentrate on Japanese direct investment in Europe. 
3 Garnaut, R., Australia and the North East Asian Ascendancy, Austra li an Government Publi shing 
Service, Canberra, 1989, p . 81 . 
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2.2 Reasons fo r di rect investment 
The rea on for a bu ine deciding to invest in another country can be divided into 
, upply' (push) reason and 'market' (pull) reason . 
The ' upply' rea ons include 
• en uring a upply of, or influencing the price of, a raw material; 
• taking advantage of cheaper factors (for example labour and land) in the host country; 
• avoiding internal pressure such as pollution controls; and 
• avoiding the cost of transporting raw materials. 
The 'market' reasons include 
• ecuring or expanding a market for their goods in the host country. In some cases it 
is perceived that there is a need to produce in a market to sell in that market; 
• the need to deal with market oriented trade friction; and 
• acting in response to export oriented industrialisation policies or i111port substitution 
policie .4 
Supply-oriented investment generally takes place in developing econol1ues while 111arket-
oriented investment is generally concentrated in industrialised economies. However, this 
divi ion i not exclusive. With regard to Europe (especially western Europe), factors of 
production are not particularly cheap and there is not a wealth of raw materials. 
Therefore, Japanese firn1 investing in Europe will do so for 'market' reasons rather than 
'supply' rea ons. These reason are discussed in detail in Chapter s. 
4 Morri , op. cit., pp. 32-34 and 40. 
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Sekiguchi describes the two major economic hypotheses on direct investment. 5 The first 
is the monopolistic power or industrial organisation hypothesis, developed by Hymer and 
Kindleberger, and independently by Caves. Under this hypothesis, monopolistic or 
oligopolistic firms transplant production processes across national boundaries by taking 
advantage of their technological superiority and/or their influence on financial markets. 
Although some of the investment undertaken by the largest Japanese companies fits this 
model, the monopolistic power hypothesis does not explain FDI by small and medium-
sized Japanese manufacturers. 
The managerial resources hypothesis is based on Penrose's growth theory of firms and 
was developed by Komiya and Fayerweather. Under this hypothesis, the set of 
technologies in production, marketing and organisation are defined as "managerial 
resources" and direct investment is seen as a process of international reallocation of these 
resources . The managerial resources hypothesis can better explain FDI by small 
competiti ve firms, but does not exclude the influence of monopolistic elements on 
competition. 
2.3 Conditions for direct investment 
When etting up a business overseas, an investor faces locational disadvantages in the 
e tabli hment and operation of the business compared to the local producers. These 
include 
• higher co ts and language barrier related to gaining information on 
the in titutional fran1ework, 
5 Sekiguchi , S., Japanese direct foreign investment, Macmillan , London, 1979, pp . 4-6. See also, 
Ozawa, T. , MLlltinationalism, Japanese Style, Princeton Univer ity Press, New Jersey, 1979, Chapter 2. 
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the legal system, 
market structure, and 
consumer tastes in the host country; 
• communication costs between the subsidiary and headquarters; 
• problems gaining adequate human resources; and 
• discrimination against foreign firms by the host government in public procurement. 
On the other hand, for foreign investment to be viable, the investor must hold son1e net 
comparative advantage over the local producers. The advantages a business may hold 
include 
• superior management techniques; 
• technological expertise; 
• brand-names; 
• access to productive inputs (for example, a raw material source); 
• acce s to markets of importing countries (as the result of long-term contracts or 
hi torical ties); and 
• sources of cheaper capital in its home country. 6 
The relative strength of these advantages and disadvantages will determine whether a 
busine invests and will affect the total amount of direct investlnent. The greatest 
disadvantages that Japane e firm investing in Europe face are information and 
communication costs , and language barriers. On the other hand, the Inain advantages 
they hold are superior management techniques, technological expertise and brand names. 
6 Heitger, B . and Stehn, J. , "Japanese Direct Inve tment in the Ee - Respon e to the Internal Market 
1993?", Journal of Conunon Market Studies, Vol. 29 No.1, September 1990, p. 4. 
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Other factors that influence the total amount of Japanese FDI, including that to Europe 
are 
• the trength of the currency relative to the currency of host countries. A strong 
currency makes acquisition costs cheaper for the investor. 
• the economic situation in Japan. This will determine the availability of funds and the 
confidence to invest. 
• the economic situation of the world as a whole. If growth is high, confidence to 
invest will reflect this; and 
• the freedom of capital markets in Japan. Legislation can restrict the level of capital 
flows or affect the 'cost' of funds. 
2.3 Factors determining the direction of direct investment 
Certain factors increase (or decrease) the profitability of direct investment. These will 
determine where investment is directed. Sometimes these factors are important 
individually, but usually a firm will make its investment decisions based on a combination 
of a ho t country's advantages and disadvantages. Bownas identified six factors.7 
The first of the e determining factors is the size and density of the market and the rate of 
growth. If there is a large and concentrated potential market and buoyant demand, the 
expected benefits will help to overcome the risks of embarking into 'unknown territory'. 
Thi i particularly important for manufacturing investment. 
7 Bowna , G., Japan and the New Europe: Industrial Strategies and Options ill the 19905, The 
Economi t Intelligence Unit, London, 1991 , p. 71. 
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Countrie in A ia, and to a lesser extent the United States, are good examples of large, 
densely-populated, growing markets. As for Europe, although in total it has a large and 
wealthy market, it face the disadvantage of having a multitude of countries with different 
languages, cultures and standards (although this is being rectified somewhat through 
European Union). Recession has also dampened consumer demand. 
Second, investors will look to countries which have economic and political stability. 
Since investment often requires long-term commitment before gains will be realised, a 
country which has high economic variability or which is susceptible to radical shifts in the 
political ituation will be less attractive. This will be more important the higher the fixed 
co t or the longer the production process. 
Industrialised countries, including those in western Europe, clearly provide higher levels 
of economic and political stability than the developing economies. One of the greatest 
disadvantages facing Eastern Europe when trying to attract foreign investment is the 
instability there. 
Third, low comparative co ts in the host country are important. Many firms begin 
production offshore solely to overcome rising production costs in their own country. 
The e ri ing costs usually take the forn1 of the increasing price of labour or land. It is 
al 0 in1portant for the labour to be not only cheap, but of high quality. It may be that a 
ho t country has abundant supplies of raw materials, and by producing in that country, 
the co t of transport can be overcome. Another motivation for offshore production is to 
overcome political pre sure for decreased level of pollution. 
The e factor tend to relate to developing economie , particularly those within Asia. 
Although Europe has high quality labour, co t of production are high and it has few 
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natural resources. Nonetheless, some countries and regions of Europe are cheap relative 
to other . This is particularly the case for Eastern Europe. 
Fourth, an investor will look for a well-developed industrial infrastructure in related 
industrie . These may include the production of inputs, or transport and distribution 
facilitie . Industrialised countries, and particularly western Europe, rate highly in this 
category. 
Fifth, an investor will be influenced by the attitudes to investment in the host country, 
both from the government and the public. Specific investment incentives such as tax 
conces ions will provide measurable benefits. However, a welcoming attitude from both 
the government and the public will also be an important factor. This is closely related to 
the trength of bilateral relations between the investing and the host countries. 
A di cu ed in Chapter 4, the relationship between Japan and Europe has not been 
particularly strong. Some countries in Europe, especially the United Kingdom, have 
welcon1ed and encouraged Japanese FDI. However, the variation in attitudes among the 
different countries i large and the conflicts between them can, be counterproductive for 
Europe a a whole. 
Sixth, a outlined earlier in thi chapter, becau e direct investment requires intimate 
knowledge and contact, it i u ual for investors to look to investing in countries with 
imilar econolnies and ocietie to their own. Thi helps to reduce the risks involved in 
embarking on direct inve tment, and to decrease the need for investment in knowledge. 
Language barrier are orne of the greatest ob tacles to an enterpri e expanding 
production over ea . Similar ocietie allow for a moother production process, 
e pecially with regard to relation hips between management and workers. Similar 
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societies also allow a manufacturing firm to adapt its product to the new market more 
easily. 
Asian countries tend to have cultures closer to Japan than western nations. Therefore 
European countries do not rate highly in this category. Because English is the most 
widely spoken foreign language in Japan, English-speaking countries are relatively 
popular with Japanese investors. It is partly for this reason that Japanese FDI in Europe 
has been concentrated in the United Kingdom. This will be discussed further in 
Chapter 5. 
Finally, exogenous factors, such as the establishment of a trading bloc like the EU, may 
encourage firms to begin production within the bloc so as to establish access to a 
(potential) closed market. When protection reaches a critical level, firms begin to 
substitute direct investment in subsidiaries for exports to overcome import barriers. This 
also gives the firm a higher profile within the trading bloc. 8 This will be discussed in 
n10re detail in Chapter 5. 
2.4 Advantages and disadvantages for the host country 
For the host country, there are various advantages and disadvantages of direct 
inve tlnent. The e give rise to conflicting attitudes towards it. As will be discussed later, 
such attitudes have caused friction between countries within Europe. 
One of the advantage of Japanese FDI in Europe (and elsewhere) is that it provides 
fund required for investment in capital good, leading to a greater productive capacity 
8 Heitger and Stehn, op. cit., p. 7. 
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and a higher growth performance. This is particularly important if the host country has 
problems generating capital from within. The setting up of new industries or companies 
leads to higher employment. Foreign investment can also lead to increased transfers of 
technology through research and development projects, and to new marketing links. If 
dOlnestic industries can observe and learn from investing companies they can achieve 
improvements in quality and management techniques, including industrial relations. 
Foreign investment encourages local firms to have an outward orientation, leading to 
greater opportunities for trade, investment and the influence of new ideas.9 At a more 
abstract level, foreign investment provides a way for countries to expand communication, 
understanding and cooperation. 
Investment in particular industries can have special advantages. For example, increased 
foreign investment in the tourism industry is likely to be followed by increased 
international tourist flows. There is also the provision of new and more diversified 
facilities from which don1estic tourists can gain benefit. 10 
Conver ely, foreign investment does have disadvantages for ttte host country. The main 
one is that the investors may drive domestic competitors out of the market, especially 
through dumping, and thu be able to exploit their monopoly position in the longer term. 
Although investment leads to increased employment, in many cases employment of local 
personnel may be linuted as the companies merely bring workers from their home 
9 Acce conomics, Japanese In vestment ill Australia: a report prepared for the Australia-Japan 
Foundation , Canberra, 1991 , p. 3. 
lO ibid, p. 45. 
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country. Similarly, local industries will not be able to reap the benefits of increased 
production, sales and employment if the overseas companies establish so-called 
, crewdriver operations'. These are merely assembly operations where the investing 
companies import all the parts from home using little or no local content. 1 1 
Many national and state governments have introduced legislation to combat the 
disadvantages of foreign investment, both real and perceived. It should be noted that 
while there are disadvantages of foreign investment and some of the concerns are 
justified, in many cases the alarmist sentiments are unwarranted and merely the result of 
media hype and prejudices. For example, in the United States, it has been stated that 
foreign inve tment (referring particularly to Japanese) poses an "economic threat against 
national security" .12 Similar claims have been made in Europe. More attention will be 
given to the attitudes towards Japanese investment in Europe in Chapter 5. 
11 The Independent, 16 September 1991, L ondon, p. 25. 
12 JETRO Cd), JETRO white paper on world direct investments: new phase inforeigll investments and 
strategic alliances: summary Tokyo, 1989. p. 4. 
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Chapter 3. Trends in Japanese Foreign Direct Investment worldwide 
In order to analyse the changes in Japanese FDI in Europe, it is necessary to consider the 
world ituation in which these changes took place. This chapter provides that context by 
examining how total Japanese FDI has changed in terms of amount, geographical and 
ectoral di tribution, and the reasons for these changes. 
3.1 Trends in the amount of Japanese direct investment 
Until the 1970s, Japan had persistent trade deficits and there was a shortage of capital in 
Japan. The government placed strict limits on flows of investment, both in and out of the 
country, and as a result there was almost complete reinvestment in domestic industries. 
As are ult, Japanese FDI wa limited until the 1970s. In 1970, the cumulative value of 
FDI wa ju t US$3.6 billion. 13 Since that time however, there has been a phenomenal 
increa e in Japanese FDI, both in terms of amount and as a percentage of Japan's gross 
dome tic product 14. 
Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate the changes in the flow and stock of Japanese FDI since 
1970. The annual flow of new Japanese FDI was $3.3 billion in 1975 and increased 
gradually to 12.2 billion in 1985. The next four years brought a boom in total Japanese 
FDI and the annual flow grew rapidly to a peak of 67.5 billion in 1989. Rece ion in 
Japan re ulted in a lump in new FDI in the early 1990 , and the amount of new FDI fell 
each year to $34.1 billion in 1992, before a slight recovery in 1993. Mirroring the 
13 G . arnaut, op. CLl., p. 
14 Healey D. Emergence of Japan as a capital exporter, Working Paper 90-6, University of Adelaide, 
Dept. of Economic, Adel aide 1990 p. 22. 
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change in the flow of FDI, the stock of Japanese FDI increased steadily from $3.6 billion 
in 1970 to $83.7 billion in 1985. It then rose dramatically to $253 billion in 1989 when 
Japan wa the world's largest capital exporter. Through the 1990s, the increase in the 
stock of Japanese FDI has been more gradual. At the end of March 1994, total stock 
was $422.6 billion. The reasons for these changes are discussed below. 
Figure 2 charts the percentage annual changes (compared with the previous year) in 
stocks and flows of Japanese FDI from 1973 to 1992. From this graph we can make a 
number of important observations. Firstly, the changes in the flow of Japanese FDI 
(indicated by the bars) are extremely variable. This serves to emphasise the volatile 
nature of direct investment (as discussed in Chapter 2), and due to this volatility, it is not 
constructive to try to identify trends in this series. On the other hand, the changes in the 
stock of Japanese investment (indicated by the line), which is the more relevant variable, 
show more consistent and interpretable trends. The stock of Japanese FDI increased 
strongly in the early 1970s with a peak in 1973. This was followed by a steady, but 
annually relatively slnall, increase between the late 1970s and the mid 1980s, with a small 
peak in 1981. There was a n1ajor boom in the second half of the 1980s when both the 
tock and flow of Japanese FDI increased at an unprecedente<;l rate. In the early 1990s, 
although the stock of Japanese FDI continued to grow, the rate of change was much 
slower than in the previous five years. 
Let u con ider the reason for the strong growth in Japanese FDI in the early 1970s and 
the n1all r boom in the early 1980s. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970 , the Japanese government began to liberalise the capital 
n1arket by rai ing the ceiling on the as et size of overseas inve tment. The growth in the 
stock of FDI at that time would have been a re ponse to that liberalisation, with firms 
-22-
Chapter 3 Trends in Japanese FDf worldwide 
adju ting upwards for the re trictions previously imposed. Coinciding with the 
liberali ation and as one of the factors leading to it, Japan began to show an ever-
increa ing trade urplus accompanied by a surplus of savings over investment at this time. 
This re ulted in an increa ing supply of capital and the imbalance was corrected by 
increa ing capital outflow, leading to increasing amounts of FDI. Despite the easing of 
re triction on Japanese capital movements, the rigidities in the international capital 
market allowed a situation of cheaper capital in Japan and other parts of North Asia to 
per ist through the 1970s and 1980s. 
Through the 1970s, Japan also began to embark on a process of internationalisation, 
broadening its horizons in an effort to become recognised as a world power. This led 
firm to have an outward orientation and to look to the advantages of foreign investment. 
Theyal 0 gained oversea experience and a knowledge of international business 
trategie . Concurrently, national income and production levels in the countries with 
which Japan conducted most of its trade began to increase substantially , encouraging 
direct inve tment. 15 
The main rea on for the increa e in Japanese FDI in the 1970~ and 1980s was the 
appreciation of the yen. The boom in direct investment have generally coincided with 
period in which the value of the yen was high relative to other currencies, particularly 
with re aluation in 1985. An appreciation of the yen make J apane e exports Ie 
comp titi e a the relative co t of production in Japan increa e. J apane e bu ine e 
adopted ariou trategie to 0 ercome thi reduced competitivene . They rationali ed 
and impro ed producti e efficiency, or diver ified to produce product with a higher 
Ie el of profitability. The third corporate trategy that busine e adopted to overcome 
15 B ala a and oland. op. cit., p. l12. 
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an appreciation of the yen was globalisation. Firms either formed alliances with foreign 
firms or invested directly, shifting their operations offshore to take advantage of lower 
production costs.1 6 A strong yen also made the cost of investing to Japanese businesses 
lower. 
The other international factor that must be considered in this period is the effect of the oil 
crises of 1973 and 1978. Unlike the other factors described above, at the time of the oil 
crises there tended to be a smaller increase in Japanese foreign investment stocks. With 
the instability of the world situation and especially concern about Japan's resource needs, 
firm ("guided" by the government) were more cautionary in their stance and limited their 
FDI. Investment in this period was directed towards resource security for this reason. 
Figure 3, which magnifies part of Figure 1, graphs the annual flow of Japanese FDI 
between 1983 and 1993 to illustrate the boom and then the slump. As outlined 
previously, the rapid increase in Japanese FDI began in the second half of the 1980s. 
Between 1983 and 1989, the flow of investment showed none of the volatility expressed 
in the previous 15 years, but rather continual annual increases. The amount of 
inve tment almost doubled from $12.2 billion in 1985 to $22.3 billion in 1986 and then 
increased by almost 50 per cent each year to a peak of $67.5 billion in 1989. Between 
1986 and 1990, the cumulative value of Japanese FDI almost tripled from $106 billion to 
$3 11 billion, making Japan the world's largest source of international capital at that 
time. 17 
16 Berg ten, F. and Noland, M . (eds.), Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System, 
In titute of International Economics, Washington DC, 1993, p. 279. 
17 JETRO (a), J 993 White Paper: Kaigai ChokusetsLl Toshi (Overseas Direct In vestment)", Tokyo, 
1993, p. 522. 
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The Japanese External Trade Organisation (JETRO) cites several general factors that 
contributed to this boom. The strong appreciation of the yen following the Plaza 
agreement of 1985 doubled the purchasing power of the yen. This decreased acquisition 
costs in other countries while at the same time decreasing the profitability of Japanese-
produced exports, and made investment overseas more attractive to Japanese firms. 
Coupled with this, the 'bubble economy' provided a surplus of funds making borrowing 
easier for firms. It also served to inflate the price of real estate in Japan (while overseas 
land prices tended to fall) which made production in Japan more expensive and at the 
same time made both production and investment in real estate overseas more attractive. 
Japan's labour costs were expensive relative even to western countries, let alone the 
developing ones. This provided further incentive for off-shore production to reduce 
input costs.I8 There was also an improvement in the capacity of Japanese financial 
institutions to act as go-betweens in merger and acquisition deals. l9 
As di cu ed in Bergsten and Noland, the increasing number of Japanese finns investing 
overseas provided the impetus for other firn1s to undertake FDI. Not only were the firn1s 
pres ured to keep up with their rivals in terms of business performance, many had to 
follow their investing trading partners to maintain business. 20 . 
The good economic conditions in Japan in the econd half of the 1980s provided a 
confident atmosphere. There was continued relaxation of regulation in the financial 
sector and finns continued to adopt globalisation and global localisation strategies as a 
n1ean to increase profitability. The e strategies are detailed later in this chapter. 
l8 'b 'd l l . 
19 JETRO Cd), op. cit., p. 7. 
20 Berg ten and Noland, op. cit., p. 279. 
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Despite the high value of the yen, the large deficits on the current account continued, and 
inve tment was seen as a strategy to avoid trade friction in the US and in Europe. This 
will be di cussed in more detail in Chapter 5, as will changes attributable to specific 
regional factors, such as European unification. 
With the collapse of the 'bubble economy' and with sustained recession in Japan, there 
was a sharp fall in the annual flow of Japanese FDI. Referring again to Figure 3, from 
1990 until 1992 there were continued decreases in the amount of new Japanese FDI. 
From the peak in 1989 of $67.5 billion, Japanese FDI fell to $57 billion in 1990, $42 
billion in 1991 and $34 billion in 1992. Japan has lost its mantle as the world's largest 
source ofFDI, slipping back to third behind the USA and France.21 The number of cases 
of direct investment fell from 6589 in 1989 to 4564 in 1991.22 
The rea ons for this fall are closely linked to the end of the 'bubble economy' in Japan and 
recessions both in Japan and worldwide. Funds began to dry up and the performance of 
tran national companies on the Tokyo stock exchange plummeted, thus decreasing the 
fund available for foreign investment. Banks balance sheets worsened. With the world-
, 
wide recession and increased competition from European and American producers, as 
well as increased labour costs and interest payments, FDI proved to be less profitable. 
Finn took a more cautionary stance toward overseas investment.23 In addition, by that 
21 Brenchley, F. , "Asia take biggest share", Australian Finan cial Review, 31 August 1994, p. 12. 
22 JETRO (a), op. cit., p. 60. 
23 ibid., pp . 76-82. 
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time mo t major companies had already made substantial investments and inroads into the 
American and European markets. 24 
De pite the fact that flows of Japanese FDI decreased dramatically in the early 1990s, the 
amount of inve tment remained higher than the flows prior to the boom. It could be 
ugge ted that the amount of FDI in the late 1980s were 'abnormal' and that since that 
time inve tment has returned to a more normal pattern. In 1993, the amount of new 
Japane e FDI was $36.02 billion, an increase of 5.5 per cent and the first increase since 
1989. There is also optimism that this trend will continue.25 Further discussion of 
rea on for the increase in 1993 and an analysis of future prospects is given in Chapter 6. 
3.2 Sectoral distribution 
In 1960, 50.6 per cent of Japanese FDI was in the primary sector, 27.4 per cent in 
manufacturing industrie and 22 per cent in tertiary industries. By 1985, the sectoral 
di tribution had changed dramatically with re ources accounting for 16.1 per cent of the 
total, manufacturing 30.2 per cent and tertiary indu tries 53.7 per cent. 26 Table 3 and 
Figure 5 how the change in the world sectoral distribution of Japan's FDI since 1983. 
An intere ting ob ervation i that the compo ition of Japanese FDI by sector was similar 
at the beginning and end of the decade (1983-1993), but was considerably different 
during the period of the 'bubble economy'. 
24 Kimura H., "Japane e Firm and the Single Market: Ready for any eventua lity ", The Japall Tim es, 
M ay 9 1992, p. B2. 
25 u tralia-Japan Economic In titute, Economic Bulletin, Volume 2 0 6, June 1994, p. 3. 
26 M ' . 19 orr! , op. cLf. p. . 
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The hare of Japanese FDI in manufacturing industries is small by world standards.27 As 
shown in Figure 5(a), investment in manufacturing industries has been fairly stable in the 
la t decade, consistently accounting for 25 to 30 per cent of total Japanese FDI. The 
exception was in the period between 1985 and 1987 when there was a sharp fall in the 
hare directed towards these industries. In 1993, manufacturing made up 30.9 per cent 
of the total with electrical equipment, chemicals and machinery the main beneficiaries. 
Inve tment in the production of transport equipment (mainly cars), while still strong, 
howed a ignificant decrease. 28 
Between 1951 and 1992 cumulative investment in manufacturing industries was 26.5 per 
cent, showing that the trend has been a slight increase in the share directed to these 
industries. In 1993, this sector had a growth of 10.7 per cent, the highest for many years. 
This trend i largely the result of the strong yen as firms have had to make decisions to 
move their operations offshore to maintain competitiveness.29 The share directed 
toward manufacturing has increased as a result of a shift away from certain non-
manufacturing industries, as described below. 
A hown in Figure 5(a), non-manufacturing industries have typically accounted for 65 to 
70 per cent of Japanese direct investment, except between 1985 and 1987 when their 
hare reached as much a 80 per cent. 30 In 1993, non-luanufacturing industries 
accounted for 68.4 per cent of Japanese FDI. 
27 JETRO (d), op. cit. , p. . In 1987, 4% of the total output of Japanese firm s was produced overseas 
compared to 20% of U and West German producti on. Morris,op. cit. , p . 22. 
2 u tra li a-Japan Economic In titute, op. cit., p. 8. 
29 'b'd 6 l l . , p. . 
30 JETRO (a), op. cit. , p. 523; JETRO (b) , 1991 White Paper: Sekai to Nihon flO Kaigai Chokusetsu 
Toshi (Overseas Direct fll vestm.ent)", Tokyo, 199 1, p. 480; Mini stry of Finance, Japan, Financial 
Statistics of Japan, Tokyo , variou edition . 
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The distribution of inve tment within the non-manufacturing industries has undergone 
interesting changes. This is illustrated by Figure 5eb). The proportion directed to 
resources and agriculture has shown a tendency to decrease, falling from 5.3 per cent of 
the total in 1985 to 1.9 per cent in 1987, despite rebounding a little since then. The share 
directed to transport has decreased significantly. Investment in the banking and insurance 
industries led the boom in non-manufacturing investment between 1985 and 1987, but 
their share has fallen significantly to pre-boom levels since then. However, as trade and 
investment in other industries increase, there is likely to be renewed interest in the 
banking sector as Japanese firms move to service the other industries. The proportion of 
Japanese FDI going to real estate reached a peak of 21.4 per cent in 1991, as Japanese 
land prices soared and foreign land remained relatively cheap. However, it fell back a 
little in 1992 and 1993 as the effects of the collapse of the 'bubble economy' were felt and 
Japanese land prices returned to more reasonable levels. The share directed to service 
industries has shown a strong upward trend. 
Non-manufacturing investment in 1993 is characterised by an even spread between 
industrie , rather than the dominance by banking or real estat~ that was evident in 
previou years. In addition, this distribution closely reflects the long term cumulative 
share of the various industries. This indicates that the pattern has returned to a more 
stable tate. 
The difference between Inanufacturing and non-lnanufacturing investment, and the total 
is the amount directed to establishment of branches of a con1pany. 
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Figure 6 shows the sectoral distribution of Japanese FDI divided by region in 1991. 
Clearly the sectoral distribution of Japanese FDI in different regions varies greatly 
depending on the regions' ectoral biases and comparative advantages, as outlined in 
Chapter 2. Both North America and Europe have a ratio of manufacturing to non-
manufacturing investment of three to seven, similar to the ratio of the total. Latin 
America and Oceania have a strong bias toward non-manufacturing industries and Asia 
has a relative bias toward manufacturing industries. The reasons for these biases are 
discussed below in conjunction with the reasons affecting the geographic distribution. It 
is difficult to draw conclusions about the Middle East and Africa with such a small 
amount of investment and just one year's data. 
3.3 Geographic distribution 
In addition to the increasing amount of Japanese FDI since the 1970s, there have been 
significant changes in the geographical pattern of this investment. Figure 4 shows the 
distribution of Japanese FDI by area in 1983 and 1993, while Figure 3 and Table 2 give 
an indication of how the distribution has changed in the last decade. Although there is 
inherent volatility in the distribution, some strong trends are eyident. 
The mo t evident trend is that, coinciding with the boom in Japanese FDI, there was a 
shift from investment in developing countries to industrialised economies. In 1983, 
inve tment directed to industrialised countries (largely North America, Europe and 
Oceania) accounted for far less than half of all Japanese FDI. At the height of the boom, 
in 1989 and 1990, the share of Japanese FDI to these countries wa more than 80 per 
cent. With the fall in the an10unt of FDI in the la t two years, there has been a parallel 
fall in the hare going to indu triali ed countrie . However, it remain at a strong level. 
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Conver ely, the hare directed toward developing economies was strong until the early 
19 0 ,then uffered a fall, and ha recently begun to show signs of recovery. 
Con idering the regions individually, the percentage directed toward North America 
increa ed ub tantially from 20 per cent in 1974 to a peak of 50.2 per cent in 1989. 
Inve tment to North America peaked somewhat earlier than in the other industrialised 
countrie and has since fallen to 42.4 per cent of the total in 1993. The share directed to 
Europe increased from 8.6 per cent in 1978 to more than 25 per cent in 1992, but, as 
with North America, has decreased since then) 1 This trend is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5. The share directed to Oceania (largely Australia and New Zealand) also 
increa ed rapidly, from l.5 per cent in 1984 to 7.9 per cent in 1991. 
A ia wa the leading regional destination for Japanese FDI between 1974 and 1981, but 
wa overtaken by the US, and more recently, Europe. In the last decade, the percentage 
of J apane e FDI directed toward Asia decreased from 22.7 per cent in 1983 to 10 per 
cent in 1986 and remained at around that level until the early 1990s, when there was a 
ignificant increase to 18.4 per cent of the total in 1993 . 
Latin America uffered a large fall in its share of Japanese FDI from a substantial 23.1 per 
cent in 19 3 (more than any region except North America) to 6.4 per cent in 1990. The 
hare to the Middle Ea t and Africa, also decreased to very small levels in the late 1980s. 
3 1 Turner, P ., Japan and Europe as trading partners: retrospect and prospect, Australia-Japan Research 
Centre, Publi c emi nar, October 1991, p. 30. 
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After the nited State (40.9 per cent), the leading recipient countrie of Japanese FDI in 
1993 were the nited Kingdom (7.0 per cent), the Netherlands (6.1 per cent) , Australia 
(5.3 per cent) and China, the big improver, with 4.7 per cent of the tota1. 32 
The corporate trategie of J apane e firms and the policies of the government in the 
1970 were largely determined by Japan' trade and resource procurement needs. 33 For 
thi rea on Japan' early direct inve tments, concentrated in the ASEAN countries and in 
Latin America, were important in en uring a constant and stable supply of natural 
re ource largely mineral , to fuel Japan's growing industrial machine. A large 
proportion of the e re ource came from Indone ia and Australia (50% of the total 
between 1968 and 1977)34. Japan wa also looking to secure export markets for its 
capital good and this resulted in direct investment in manufacturing industries in the 
de eloping economie .35 
wage and other production co t ( uch as rent) in Japan began to ri e and pressure 
wa brought to bear on the manufacturing companies by anti-pollution groups, these 
firm looked to hifting labour-inten ive indu trie , such a the manufacture of car, 
electronic and textile , off hore. There were further incentive after the appreciation of 
the en in 1985 made uch option even cheaper. 
32 u tralia-Japan Economic In titute,op. cit., p. 4. 
33 Dry dale. P., Japanese directforeign investment in Australia in comparative perspective, Pacific 
Economic Paper o. 223 Canberra, 1993 , p. . . 
34 Hori, T. , The Japanese and the Australians: business and cultural exchange, Pergamon Press, 
ydney, 19 2, p. 109. 
35 mdt, H. Australia and Asia: economic essays, Australian ational Univer ity Press, Canberra, 
1972, p. 
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In order to combat the rising cost of producing in Japan, there was an increase in 
investment in the Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) of Northeast Asia, such as 
South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In the NIEs, labour costs were 
relatively low, and these countries were close to Japan both geographically and culturally, 
thus reducing establishment and operating costs.36 However, as the NIEs themselves 
began to show economic strength in the 1970s and 1980s, they lost some of their 
'locational advantages' for Japanese FDI as the wage costs in these countries began to 
rise relative to the rest of the world and thus the profitability was reduced. 
ASEAN countries, especially Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, continued to be 
appealing, with their low labour costs, geographic proximity, and large supply of natural 
resources. It was cheaper to produce close to the source of raw materials, especially 
tho e that were expensive to transport to Japan to process (such as metals and timber). 
A China's market has been liberalised, it has become a favoured destination for Japanese 
FDI with a large market, geographic and cultural proximity and an abundant, cheap 
labour supply. 
At the arne time as the NIEs began to show economic strength, the Japanese economy 
began to lose its comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries and there was a 
shift to capital-intensive and technological industries. This allowed greater scope for 
investment in developed economies, including Europe. The liberalisation of international 
capital market allowed J apane e financial institutions to operate overseas. There was 
al 0 ignificant investment in real estate, especially as the cost of land in Japan soared 
during the 'bubble economy' year. As Japane e income levels have risen, there has been 
an increa e in the number of Japanese touri t venturing oversea and J apane e 
36 Garnaut, op. cit. , p. 88. 
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companies have set up operations overseas to service these visitors. There has also been 
a tendency for Japanese businesses to counteract rising protectionist sentiments in the 
West (especially in the United States and Europe) and protect their market share by 
investing in local industries and thus overcoming import barriers. 
Morri portrays the pattern of Japanese FDI as a two stage process - globalisation and 
global localisation. 37 The globalisation stage took place up to the mid 1980s. Japanese 
companies set up manufacturing operations overseas in a basic form largely to overcon1e 
rising costs in Japan. Control remained completely with the parent company in Japan. 
The over eas operations were just at the final assembly stage with little local content or 
R&D conducted at the plant. This investment was concentrated in developing 
econorrues. 
In the second stage, global localisation, the companies 'deepen' their investment, 
beconung insiders in the destination market. They shift their offshore operations fron1 
a sembly to full manufacture by transferring decision making and R&D functions and 
increa ing local content by using local suppliers. Global localisation became important in 
the late 1980 and 1990s at the same time as investment in in<;iustrialised countries, 
including European ones, became more dominant. 
This hift from globali ation to global localisation is market driven. Companies see it as 
necessary to produce within the market to which they wish to sell. This facilitates 
increased re ponsivene s to market changes. In a consumer driven market, it is necessary 
for producers to adapt quickly to delnand changes. In such as situation, a subsidiary 
mu t be able to adju t without having to turn to the headquarter for managerial advice, 
37 M ... . 24 0 111 ,op. elf., pp. - . 
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parts or new product developments. The shift from globalisation to global localisation is 
closely related to the increased investment in industrialised countries which is both a 
cause and an effect. 
In contra t to Europe, the United States has been a popular destination for Japanese 
capital exports. This is because the conditions there coincide largely with those described 
in Chapter 2 as making investment more profitable. For example, it has a large and 
relatively buoyant market. The political and economic situation is stable. Raw materials 
and land are abundant and there is a strong industrial infrastructure. Labour, while not 
particularly cheap, is of high quality. The close relationship between the United States 
and Japan provides a solid base for both trade and investment. The Japanese have a good 
knowledge of the American economy and society, a legacy of America's occupation of 
Japan after the war and of a continuing security and political role. With English as the 
spoken language, the Japanese feel far more comfortable than in countries where other 
languages are dominant. 
This chapter has provided the context from which to extend analysis of Japanese FDI in 
Europe. Many of the factors considered above have affected .Japanese FDI in Europe. 
However, there are other factors specific to Europe that will be examined in detail in the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 4. Japan's relationship with the European Union 
One of the main reasons for the increased share of Japanese FDI directed to Europe is the 
establishment and development of the EU. The scope of this thesis does not permit a 
complete description and analysis of the history of the European Union, which is covered 
in much detail elsewhere38 . However, in order to provide the necessary background for 
the analysi in Chapter 5, this chapter outlines the main points. Further, the relationship 
between Europe and Japan, and the trade friction between them are important factors 
affecting Japanese FDI to Europe. This chapter, therefore, provides an outline of the 
political and economic relations and trade friction between the EU and Japan and 
provides background for the following chapter. 
4.1 Brief history of the European Union 
The European Economic Community (later to become the European Community and 
now referred to as the European Union) was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome 
with the original six member nations being France, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, The 
Netherlands and Belgium. The reason for such regional integration was to allow the 
countries to take advantage of economies of scale and increase trade and co-operation 
within the region, so that they could be competitive with the United States, and ironically, 
Japan.39 It has also been suggested that by having these nations economically reliant on 
one anoth r, they are less likely to initiate intra-European conflicts.40 There have been 
38 See Harrop, 1. , The Political Economy of Integration in the European Community, London, 2nd 
ed ition, 1992; T oukali , L, The New European EconOlny, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993 ; 
Urwi n, D ., The Commullity of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945, Longman , 
London, 1991. 
39 "The Battle for Europe", International Business Week, June 3, 1991, p. 19 . 
40 "Survey: The European Community", The Economist, July 11, 1992, p. 5. 
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four enlargements of the Community with Britain, Ireland and Denmark joining in 1973, 
Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, and Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995. 
The combined population of the 15 nations is about 373 million people. 
Integration has taken place gradually, firstly with the elimination of internal tariff barriers, 
then free movement of resources including labour, and monetary union in the late 1970s. 
The Maastrict Treaty, signed in 1992 and entered into force on November 1 1993 
following ratification by all signatories in national referenda41 , provides for closer 
European union. It complements the initiative of the Single European Market with free 
circulation of goods, capital, services and people. Development of Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), including a single currency, establishment of a central bank and 
harmonisation of economic policies, is aimed for by 1999.42 As discussed in Chapter 5, it 
is these developments that have accelerated the growth of Japanese FDI in the EU. 
EU countries are required to move towards 'conditions for economic convergence' by 
decreasing inflation rates and budget deficits. It is also hoped to develop a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, and more integrated policies in areas such as justice, social 
policy and home affairs. However, there have been problems,in European integration 
which may stifle Japanese FDI. These are discussed in Chapter 6. 
41 The fir t Danish referendum in June 1992 produced a "no" vote. A second referendum in May 1993 
produced a majority of "yes" votes after EC Government leaders granted Denmark special status which 
doe not bind it to the main Treaty objectives of a sing le curren cy, common defence and immigration 
policie and European citizenship. 
European report, No . 1833 (February 6 1993) and 1860 (May 20 1993). 
42 Leng, J. , "World trade is the hallmark of the EC", The Japan Times, May 9, 1992, p. B2. 
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The member hip application of Austria, Sweden and Finland were approved by the 
European Parliament, and following positive outcomes in national referenda, they joined 
on January 1 1995.43 It i also envisaged that in the longer term (although probably not 
until next century) the membership of the community could be extended to include 
countrie of Eastern Europe, such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.44 A 
larger market will be even more enticing for Japanese investors. A more diversified 
community, including the lower-cost countries of Eastern Europe, would also provide 
Japane e investors with better opportunities for intra-regional division of labour. These 
issues are discussed further in Chapter 6. 
The EU constitutes the world's biggest and most powerful trading region45 , and 
following the accession of the three new members in 1995, has a combined GDP of 
almo t $US7 billion. Since the late 1980s, the EU has been plagued by low growth 
rate 46 and unemployment of over 10 per cent.47 Japanese FDI is seen by many in the 
EU as a solution to these problems. 
43 The European Parliament also approved Norway's application to join the EU. However, the 
Norwegian people declined the opportunity in a national referendum on 28 November 1994. 
44" urvey: The European Community", p . 19. 
45 GDP in 1993 : 
EU - U 6415 billion 
USA - U 6387 billion 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, Washington, DC, 1993. 
46 Real GDP growth in the EU in 1991 was l.3 %. JETRO (a), op. cit., p. 263. 
47 The rate of unemployment in the EU has risen without interruption for the past four years, peaking at 
11 per cen t in April and M ay 1994. The seasonally adjusted figure·s for July 1994 show a slight decrease 
to 10.8 per cent. At that time, unemployment level s were ignificantl y higher in some countries as 
shown below: 
pam 22.1% Nether lands 9.7% 
Irel and 17.6% UK 9.3% 
Ita ly 12.0% Germany 6.3% 
France 11.3 % Portugal 6.1 % 
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Fears of the EU becoming an impenetrable 'fortress' with high tariff barriers have been 
expre sed by other countries, and this is perceived to be one of the main reasons for high 
level of Japanese investment in Europe, as discussed in Chapter 5. EU officials have 
argued trongly against this criticism claiming that "the unified market's goal is to form a 
freer broad economic bloc which should prove equally beneficial to its members and the 
rest of the world" .48 
4.2 Japan's political and economic relationship with Europe 
Although the relationship between Europe and Japan dates back to the thirteenth century, 
traditionally it has been relatively weak. In a world of trilateral economic power, that is 
the US, Europe and Japan , the links between Japan and the US and Europe and the US 
are relatively strong, while the relationship between Japan and Europe remains the weak 
link. It ha been described as a relationship marked by misunderstanding, preconceptions 
and tereotypes. As described in Chapter 2, a strong relationship between countries and a 
good knowledge of each other facilitates investment flows. Conversely, the weak 
relationship between Japan and Europe has not provided a strong basis for Japanese FDI 
in Europe. 
The J apane e borrowed indu trial expertise and technology, and political, legal and 









Eurostat: Unemployment, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Brussel and 
Luxembourg, October 1994. 
4 JETRO Cd), op. cit., p. 4. 
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nineteenth century, and have always been keen to copy aspects of European culture and 
ociety. However, the Japane e fascination with Europe was not reciprocated. To 
European ,Japan has been a mall country on the other side of the world, culturally, 
hi torically and politically different. European images of Japan have, for a long time, 
been ba ed on the 'yellow peril' and on the influx of low quality Japanese goods made 
with cheap labour in the 1930s. While it was the Americans that forced the opening of 
Japan, European interests in Asia were largely centred on China, India, and Persia. This 
lack of interest persisted until the economic success of Japan in the 1960s and 1970s 
forced the Europeans to take notice. 
In the po t-war period, both Europe and Japan were in ruins , and the main priority was 
recon truction. Little attention was shown on either side towards developing 
relation hips between them. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Europeans were primarily 
interested in internal political unity. li The intervening years of neglect have taken heavy 
toll in term of the [EU's] ability to formulate coherent policies relating to Japan. "49 By 
the time the Europeans became conscious of the Japanese economic miracle, it was too 
late to form a close trading relationship and take advantage of a ready and growing 
J apane e market. The legacy of this neglect remains with a w~ak intensity of trade as 
described later in this chapter. 
There wa al 0 a lack of unity from the EU as a group, with, instead, a wide range of 
policy re pon es and bilateral agreements between individual members and Japan. No 
conunon corrunercial or industrial policy towards Japan was concluded. 50 This lack of 
49 Corbett , 1. , The European Community's trade with Japan - issues and implementations, Australia-
Japan Economic Rel atio ns Research Project, Paper No. 48, Canberra, 1978, p. 2. 
50 T oukali ,L. and White, M . (eds.), Japan and Western Europe: Conflict and Cooperation, Pinter, 
London , 1982, p. 11 3. 
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unity ha allowed the different countries in Europe to develop their own approaches 
towards Japanese trade and investment, and has caused conflict within Europe, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
On the part of Japan, diplomatic efforts towards Europe in the early post-war period 
were poradic and not particularly assertive. Japan's foreign policy was focussed on the 
United States and within the Asia-Pacific region as economic and strategic interests were 
centred there. No formal framework for cooperation or alliance, such as NATO or the 
US-Japan Security Treaty, was ever concluded between Europe and Japan. 
The relationship improved somewhat in the 1970s with the establishment of the unofficial 
Trilateral Commission to set up a structure for the exchange of ideas about co-operation 
between the US, western Europe and Japan. There have also been increased political 
contacts and annual high level consultations. However, "such encounters have usually 
ended with platitudinous statements and promises designed not to offend anyone rather 
than substantial outcomes".51 
The situation of nlisunderstanding was not helped by such corpments as the description of 
the Japanese in a 1979 EC memorandum as "workaholics living in rabbit hutches" or de 
Gaulle' description of Prilne Minister Ikeda a "a transistor salesman" . 52 A survey in 
1993 showed that 90 per cent of Europeans still thought that J apanese-EU cooperation 
and con ultation were not well reported or understood. 53 
51 ibid. , p. 93 . 
52 ibid, p. 17. 
53 "European want Japan to do more, poll find It, The Japan Times, 3 July 1993, p. 2. 
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In respon e to the lack of understanding, in July 1994, the European Commission 
produced a paper entitled Towards a new Asia Strategy to define an overall policy 
approach toward Asia. It calls for increased co-ordination of EU policies, the 
strengthening of the EU's presence in Asia and a higher European profile. A range of 
measure are in place in order to strengthen the bilateral ties between Japan and the EU, 
including the Trade Assessment Mechanism, export promotion initiatives, industrial 
cooperation, education programs for the EU business community, ongoing regulatory 
dialogue, the Trade Cooperation Commission and the ongoing rounds of bilateral and 
multilateral discussions. 
Economically, the relationship between Japan and Europe has also been weak. It is in the 
area of trade that most friction between Japan and the EU has arisen. Japan and Europe 
are not natural trading partners and the flow of trade between them, relative to their 
economic size and trade with other countries and regions, reflects this. In order to 
illustrate the weak trading relationship between Japan and Europe compared to their 
relationship with North America, Corbett calculated the 'Intensity of Trade Index' 
between Japan and the EEC (a it was in 1975), Japan and North America, and North 
America and the EEC. The 'Intensity of Trade Index' measur~s the strength of trade 
flow between two countries or regions, relative to their world shares of exports and 
import . The formula is given in Appendix A. Corbett's analysis clearly showed that the 
trade between North America and Japan was very intense with indices of 1.47 and l.22. 
Trade between the EEC and orth America wa not as strong at 0.31 and 0.50. The 
weake t link wa between Japan and the EEC; the indices were only 0.29 and 0.11.54 
54 Corbett, op. cit. , p. 16. 
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I have attempted to update the e indices to 1992, calculating them using the same 
formula a Corbett did, and including the intensity of trade indices for Australian exports 
to Japan and Japanese export to Australia. It should be noted, however, that the form of 
the EU ha changed since Corbett did her study, and the results should be considered in 
that light. The re ults of the calculations showed some interesting results and are 
pre ented in Appendix A. 
The inten ity of trade between the EU and Japan (in both directions) has increased 
ub tantially ince 1975. The intensity index for Japanese imports from the EU doubled 
between 1975 and 1992, moving from 0.11 to 0.22, while the intensity of trade from 
Japan to the EU increased from 0.29 to 0.46. Nevertheless, the low values of these 
indice indicate that trade between the EU and Japan remains weak compared to their 
trade with the rest of the world. The trade relationship between Japan and the US 
remained inten e, and the indices increased for trade in both directions to l.62 and 1.4l. 
The inten ity of trade between the EU and North America actually decreased for trade in 
both direction and the intensity of trade index for North American exports to the EU 
(0.40) fell below the equivalent index for Japanese exports to .the EU. The high indices 
for Au tralia-J apan trade, and particularly for Australian export to Japan (4.12), 
illu trate the highly complementary trading relationship (in contra t to the EU-Japan 
relation hip) and the ignificance of our trade flows relative to Australia's and Japan's 
world trading po ition . 
The weakn of the trading relation hip between Japan and the EU i not urpnslng. 
The ha e imilar economic tructure - both are indu triali ed, market-ba ed economies 
with a relati ve lack of natural re ource - and therefore they lend to produce the same 
type of good. Thi i illu trated by the fact that in 1993, manufactured product 
-43-
Chapter 4 Japan 's relationship with the European Union 
accounted for 99% of EU imports from Japan and 830/0 of exports. 55 As a result they are 
competitors in both product and factor markets, rather than complementing each other as 
Australia and Japan do. There is also the problem of geographical separation, which 
re ults in high transport and transaction costs. In addition, semi-natural cultural and 
historical barriers (as described above) tend to impede trade. 
The natural and semi-natural barriers are exacerbated by the imposition of tariff and non-
tariff barriers on both sides. Protection remains the greatest stumbling block to a more 
fruitful relationship. The weak political and economic relationships between Japan and 
Europe have not provided a strong basis for Japanese FDI in Europe. Conversely , 
however, trade friction and protectionism in Europe, either real or anticipated, have been 
strong catalysts for Japanese FDI, as described below. 
4.3 Protection as a stimulus for investment 
The cau e of most friction is the well-publicised, and large and growing trade surplus that 
Japan ha with the EU. Since 1968, Japan has never had a deficit in its trade with the 
EU56. It i the rapid increa e in the surplus throughout the la,st two decades, but 
particularly in the late 1980 and early 1990s, that has been of concern. The surplus grew 
from $18 billion in 1990 to $28 billion in 1991, and then 31 billion in 1992 before 
decrea ing lightly to $27 billion in 199357 . Japan's trade with the EU since 1986 and the 
balance of trade i illu trated in Figure 7. 
55 De lega tion of the European Commi io n to Au tra li a a nd New Zealand, European Union News, 
Vol 12 07, October ovember 1994, p. 3. 
56 I hikawa, K., JapaJl and the Challenge of Europe 1992, Pinter Pu bli her, Lo ndo n, 1990, p. 44. 
57 Internati onal M o netary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly, June 1994. 
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The J apane e have often been criticised for protecting their industries. In the 1950s and 
1960s, Japanese manufacturing industries were highly protected by tariffs. These have 
been removed, but European (and American) exporters claim that Japanese industries 
remain protected by non-tariff barriers. The Europeans point to Japan's low level of 
manufactured imports and are looking for those markets to be opened. They claim that 
Japan ha not made an adequate effort to adapt its system for higher imports. The 
Japanese respond by saying that the Europeans have made little effort to penetrate the 
Japanese market which has great potential for them, instead being more concerned with 
internal problems. 
On the other hand, European protection against Japanese imports has a long history. It 
has been present since the pre-war period and intensified in periods of recession in 
Europe. In recent years, protection has generally taken the form of non-tariff barriers, in 
particular Quantitative Restrictions (QRs), anti-dumping duties and voluntary export 
restraints (YERs). 
With a large trade deficit with Japan, exacerbated by high unqnployment levels and 
continuing economic woes in Europe in the 1980s (as described earlier in this chapter), 
criticisln of Japan was intense and there was pressure for higher protection levels against 
Japane e export. The EU ha been frustrated by what it describes as Japan's preferential 
treatment of the US. 58 European autolnobile makers and electronics companies are 
particularly worried about competition from Japanese imports. 
58 "Japan-EC to face off over trade barriers", The Japan Times, 24 August \993, p. \ O. 
-45-
Chapter 4 Japan's relationship with the European Union 
These protectionist sentiments have brought about an increase in Japanese FDI in Europe 
as the Japanese businesses substitute direct investment for trade. Furthermore, with the 
signing of the Maastrict Treaty and the unification of Europe, many Japanese exporters 
feared that the EU would become 'Fortress Europe' with higher tariff barriers. Many 
companie decided to invest in Europe to overcome these barriers. This is discussed 
further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5. Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Europe 
5.1 Trends in the amount of Japanese direct investment in Europe 
As shown in Figure 8 and Table 4, the stock and flow of Japanese investment to Europe 
was limited until the mid-1980s. In 1985, the flow of new investment was just $1.93 
billion and the cumulative amount was $11 billion. However, between 1985 and 1990, 
there was a significant rise in Japanese investment in Europe, and particularly within the 
European Union. The flow of investment to Europe peaked in 1989 at $14.8 billion, and 
remained very strong in 1990, by which time the cumulative amount had reached $59 
billion. Along with total Japanese FDI, FDI directed to Europe fell back somewhat in 
1991 and 1992. It showed a small rise again in 1993. 
A a percentage of the total amount of Japanese FDI, investment to Europe has not 
increa ed as rapidly as the absolute amount, indicating that a large part of the increase 
was in line with increasing Japanese investment worldwide. In addition, the share 
directed toward Europe is still considerably less than that to North America, and 
relatively weak given Europe's economic size. 59 Nonetheless; the share of FDI directed 
toward Europe rose frOITI 8.6 per cent in 1978 to 15.5 per cent in 1986 and 25.1 per cent 
in 1990, before decreasing slightly in 1991 and 1992. The reasons for the increasing 
proportion are of interest, and are discussed below. 
Fir t let u consider an explanation of the pattern of Japanese investment to Europe. 
Relating European factor to the determinants of investment explained in Chapter 2, it is 
59 The amount invested in the United States is about twi ce that in ves ted in the Eu ropean Unio n despite 
their s imilar economic s ize in terms of popul ati o n and GDP. Heitger and Ste hn , op. cit., p. 2 . 
-47-
Chapter 5 Japanese FDI in Europe 
not surprising that investment to Europe was slow to take off and is not as strong as that 
to other regions and especially North America. For example, European production costs, 
especially labour, are high relative to other regions. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the economic and political relationships between Japan and the EU collectively, and Japan 
and mo t European countries individually, are based on relatively weak foundations. 
Certainly the relationship between Europe and Japan has been more remote than those 
between the US and Japan, Australia and Japan, or the EU and the US. In addition, the 
Japane e have a far more limited knowledge of Europe than they do of the US or their 
Asia-Pacific neighbours, partly because of the large geographical distance between 
Europe and Japan. The governments and public of some European countries were at best 
apathetic of, and at worst less than warm in welcoming, Japanese investment. Although 
Europe has a large and affluent market, that market has been, at least until recently, more 
fragmented in terms of economic, industrial and legal systems, languages and consumer 
tastes. 
On the positive side, Europe (like the US) is stable economically and politically, and there 
i a good industrial infrastructure. However, these positive factors alone were not strong 
enough to completely outweigh the negative factors described, above, and make Japanese 
FDI in Europe highly profitable. 
Variou explanations can be given for the rapid increase in both the amount and share of 
J apane e FDI directed to Europe in the second half of the 1980s. The rising amount has 
to be con idered in the light of rapidly increasing Japanese FDI worldwide, the reasons 
for which were outlined in Chapter 3. Nonetheless, Europe's share also increased 
dramatically. Part of this increase was in line with an increasing share of investment 
directed to indu triali ed countries. The increa ing proportion directed to Europe, North 
America and Australia was due to four important factors. 
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• Fir t, as Japan's industrial structure changed from one based on labour-intensive 
good to one more reliant on capital-intensive and technological goods, there was less 
emphasis on investing in low-cost countries. The industrialised countries provided a 
high quality labour force and research expertise. With an appreciating yen following 
the Plaza agreement in 1985 and tax incentives in these countries, the cost differential 
between Japan and the West was eroded and it was relatively cheap for the Japanese 
to undertake joint ventures or take over existing enterprises. 
• Second, there was a close correlation between the share of FDI directed to 
industrialised countries and the share directed to financial industries. A large part of 
the increase can be attributed to Japanese service companies venturing overseas to 
complement Japanese manufacturing companies trading with or investing in these 
indu trialised countries. Increased FDI in the service sectors mirrored the increase in 
Japanese exports to the industrialised countries. Furthermore, there was significant 
investment in real estate and the tourism sector as prices in Japan itself became 
exce sive. More Japanese people began to travel overseas during the affluent period 
in the 1980s. 
• Third, a was explained in previous chapters, with increased cornpetition frorn both 
local producers and tho e from third countries, firms found it necessary to produce in 
the market in order to ell in that market, so as to be responsive to consumer 
den1ands. 
• Fourth, the Japane e began to substitute direct investment for trade, as protectionist 
mea ure (either introduced or threatened) became stronger in Europe and North 
America. Some of these measures were clearly identifiable, such as quotas; other 
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were more covert taking the form of local content rules or financial inducement for 
local content levels. These sentiments were the result of the combination of poor 
economic conditions in Europe and North America, and a soaring Japanese current 
account surplus. With the formation and development of the EU, there was great 
concern in Japan that high trade barriers would be erected. This issue is discussed 
later in this chapter. 
There are important questions to be asked at this point. Was the increasing amount and 
proportion of Japanese FDI directed to Europe in the late 1980s simply in line with 
increasing FDI worldwide, and with the increased share directed to industrialised 
countries? Consequently, is the increase in Europe's share attributable only to the factors 
described above, or are there factors unique to Europe that have to be considered? 
To answer this question, I analysed the increase in FDI to Europe in the boom period 
relative to the increase in the world and in North America, attempting to show some 
difference in the change in investment flows to these regions. The results are shown in 
Appendix B. Between 1986 and 1989, Japanese FDI worldwide increased by 202 per 
cent. In the same period, investment to North America increa,sed by 225 per cent and 
that to Europe increased by 327 per cent. The annual increase on the previous year for 
Europe was far higher than for North America or worldwide in 1987 and 1989, and 
irnilar in 1988. The differential between the two industrialised regions and the world 
figure is in line with the previou observation that more investment was directed to 
indu triali ed countries in thi period. The fact that the increase in Europe was 
significantly greater than the increase in North America shows that there must have been 
orne pecial factor cau ing a shift toward Europe as an investment destination. I have 
identified three: 
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• Fir t, by the late 1980s, many Japanese companies had already invested in the US as 
hown by the earlier peak in North America's share. These companies were facing 
increa ed competition in America as American companies began to adopt more 
efficient production techniques including Japanese methods. There was also 
increa ing criticism and hostility towards the Japanese as the trade surplus ballooned. 
A a result it is quite plausible to suggest that Japanese companies began to look to 
new frontiers to set up operations - Europe was the logical choice. 
• Second, certain governments, especially the British, offered large incentives in the 
form of subsidies and tax concessions to investing firms, as they began to recognise 
the benefits of Japanese FDI. 
• Third, coinciding with the slight shift away from America (we should not 
overemphasise this - the US is still the largest destination), the Europeans were 
pu hing their way toward a unified market leading up to the signing of the Maastrict 
Treaty in 1992. This was one of the most important factors in the increased 
proportion of Japane e investment going to Europe. This is explained in more detail 
below. 
There are two a pects to the unification of Europe that act as determinants for Japanese 
inve tn1ent there - factors that cau ed an increase for a positive reason and those that 
cau ed an increa e for a negative reason. On the positive side, the creation of a single 
market partly helped to overcome one of the greatest disadvantages that the Japanese 
faced inv ting in European countries individually - the diversity of economic and 
indu trial tructure, legal y terns, cultures, language , and con umer tastes. As moves 
were n1ade to decrea e the barrier , to allow free circulation of good ,capital, ervice 
and people, to develop more integrated policies with regard to justice, social policy and 
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home affairs, and even to move towards a single currency, the Japanese began to 
recognise new advantages of investing in Europe, now a large, wealthy and more 
homogenous market.60 Furthermore, as membership of the Union increases beyond the 
present time, that market will continue to increase in size. 
From the negative side, the moves towards unification increased Japanese fears that there 
would be a high degree of protectionism in a 'Fortress Europe'. The Japanese were 
determined to invest within Europe before trade barriers were erected.61 Balassa and 
Noland described FDI as "a means to reduce trade tensions abroad"62. 
Heitger and Stehn believe that protection of industries in Europe, both existing and 
expected, is the main determinant of increased Japanese FDI in Europe. The following is 
a precis of their analysis. 63 
As outlined in Chapter 2, when looking to invest overseas, a firm weighs up the 
disadvantages it faces operating in a foreign country with the firm specific comparative 
advantage it possesses. If this equation comes out negative, the firm will not invest. A 
positive outcome is a necessary but not sufficient condition for FDI to occur. The firm 
could exploit its competitive advantage by producing at home and exporting to foreign 
ll1arkets, or by licensing its brand names, technology or manufacturing and marketing 
skills. For a firm to choose direct investment, there have to be some net location specific 
advantage or internali ation advantages. Location specific advantages include lower 
60 "The Battle for Europe", p . 16. 
61 K' . Imura, op . c lf. 
62 Bala a and Noland , op . cit., p. 1 II. 
63 Heitger and Stehn, op. cit. , pp . 3-14 . 
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wages, Ie s regulation, low taxes, relatively low labour costs, or exports impeded by 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers. They may allow FDI to substitute for trade. Figure 9 
illustrates this process. 
Heitger and Stehn use this model to analyse the reasons for the rapid rise in Japanese 
manufacturing FDI to Europe. They point out that there had to be some location specific 
advantages leading to the rapid increase in Japanese FDI to Europe in the late 1980s. 
Changes in the institutional setting would have taken place gradually and over time, not 
quickly enough to cause such a rapid rise. Although some European countries changed 
their tax ystems to promote economic growth, the tax rates in all European countries 
were still higher than in Japan. Similarly, unit labour costs in Europe were far above 
Japanese levels. 
Therefore, Heitger and Stehn claim that the high level of effective protection in Europe 
ilnposed through tariff and non-tariff barriers (voluntary export restraints, quotas, local 
content rules) was the main determinant of increased Japanese FDI in the late 1980s. 
(The saIne logic can be applied to the US, where protectionist sentiments were prominent 
ju t before the same attitudes were expressed in Europe, although effective protection 
level were not as high.) Furthermore, the changes expected during European unification 
leading up to the end of the decade make it increasingly attractive for Japanese firms to 
ub titute FDI for export. They use empirical results to support these assertions. 
The conclu ion of their analysis was that the more successful is trade liberalisation within 
the European Union, the greater the incentive for Japanese firms to establish subsidiaries 
within the EU. Thi i becau e greater market integration and internal trade liberalisation 
i likely to lead to increa ed trade diversion away from third n1arket and an increase in 
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external trade barriers as a result of interest group pressure. With increased effective 
protection levels, the incentive to choose direct investment increases. 
Ironically, the European Community was established partly as a response to the 
emergence of Japan as a world economic power. "Japanese competition has been a major 
cataly t for the Single Market. Its emergence as the second largest economic force in the 
world has forced the creation of the Single Market. "64 It seems that its establishment 
served to strengthen the Japanese resolve to build the relationship with Europe. 
Japanese FDI going to Europe in 1991 and 1992 was sluggish in line with the fall in 
Japanese investment worldwide following the end of the 'bubble economy' and recession 
in Japan. There was also a shift away from industrialised economies with recessions in 
those countries. By this stage, many of the large Japanese producers had set up facilities 
in Europe. Nonetheless, investment in Europe has remained stronger than in the period 
before the boom. 
5.2 Sectoral distribution within Europe 
Figure 11 (a) shows the composition of Japanese investment in Europe by sector in 1991. 
By amount, manufacturing investment (28.7 per cent) accounts for slightly less than it did 
in the whole world in the arne year. The transport equipment, electronics and electrical 
appliance, chemical and machinery industries were dominant. Equivalently, of the 2298 
Japane e companies in the EU, 642 were in manufacturing industries, especially 
chemical, electronics and machinery.65 Non-n1anufacturing investment accounts for 
64 Dudley, 1. , 1992: StrategiesJor the Single Market, Kogan Page Ltd. , London , 1989, p. 57. See also 
Urwin,op. cit., p. 231. 
65 JETRO (c), Directory oj Japanese-Affiliated Companies in the EC J 99 J -92, Tokyo 1991 , p. 310. 
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68.3 per cent of the total. Within this sector, there is a high percentage directed to the 
banking, finance, insurance and commerce industries.66 Much of the investment in 
service and finance industries is complementary with Japanese exports and is to support 
Japanese industries and customers in Europe. In other words, as exports from Japan to 
Europe increase, investment in these industries tends to increase. 
Figure 11(b) gives an indication of how the sectoral distribution of Japanese FDI to 
Europe has changed since 1981. The most noticeable difference is that investment in 
resources has decreased substantially, from 16.8 per cent in 1981 to just 1.8 per cent in 
1991. Investment in manufacturing has increased from around 20 per cent in both 1981 
and 1985 to almost 30 per cent in 1991, illustrating the effect of global localisation 
strategies. Investment in services also increased from 63 per cent in 1981 to 72 per cent 
in 1985, before decreasing a little in 1991. This was in line with increased Japanese 
exports to Europe, until 1993 when they were dampened by recession and the high value 
of the yen. 
Over ea investn1ent can take the form of wholly-owned subsidiaries, acquisitions, joint 
venture or offshore research and development facilities. Mo~t Japanese companies set 
up in Europe as wholly or principally owned subsidiaries, with fewer as joint-ventures 
with European businesses. In 1990, over half of Japanese manufacturers in Europe were 
embarking on ole venture with 30 per cent a joint ventures and 15 per cent as 
acquisition .67 In Northern Europe, the ratio of sole ventures to joint ventures is much 
higher. However, in Southern Europe, and particularly Spain, joint ventures tend to 
66 Ministry of Finance, Japan, op. cit., 1993. 
67 Turner, op. cit., p. 32. 
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dominate. 68 Morris predicts that as more small and medium sized enterprises embark on 
foreign investlnent projects, the number of joint ventures is likely to rise. 69 
5.3 Geographic distribution within Europe 
Let u now consider where Japanese investment in Europe is directed, how it has 
changed and the reasons for these changes. Figure 10 shows the geographical 
distribution of Japanese FDI in Europe in 1983 and in 1992. The United Kingdom is 
clearly the most dominant with 41.8 per cent of the Japanese investment in Europe 
located there. The proportion directed to the Netherlands was also significant with 20.5 
per cent of the total. Apart from Germany with 10.9 per cent and France with 6.5 per 
cent, the shares directed to other countries within the EU are relatively small. An analysis 
of the distribution of Japanese FDI in Europe compared to the share of European GDP of 
each country in 1992 (Appendix C) shows that in the UK and the Netherlands, the 
investment share is significantly stronger than the share of GDP, while in Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Ireland, investment is only slightly stronger. In Spain, Portugal and 
Greece, the share of Japanese FDI is slightly less than their share of GDP, while for 
France, Germany and Italy, the investn1ent share is significanqy less than their economic 
strength. 
68 sole venture 
Northern Europe 64% 
France 26% 
Southern Europe 19% 
ibid. 
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From another perspective, of the 2298 Japanese companies operating in the EU in 1991, 
772 were in the UK and 210 in the Netherlands. There were 623 companies with 
operation in Germany, out of proportion with the share of investment directed there, 
indicating that the operations are clearly of a smaller sizeJO Conversely, operations in 
the UK tend to be relatively large. The number of companies operating in other EU 
countries are shown in Table 5. 
The proportion of investn1ent going to European countries outside of the EU (including 
Turkey, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Scandinavia, Austria and Switzerland) 
is not large. Switzerland accounts for most of this investment, while investment in most 
East European countries can be described as minuscule. However, this does underline 
the potential for increased investment in these countries. 
The UK has consistently been a favoured destination for Japanese FDI, and its share of 
total investment has increased significantly from 1.8 per cent of total Japanese investment 
in 1973 to 8.6 per cent in 1992. The Netherlands has also consistently taken a large slice, 
and its share has increased from 1.8 per cent to 4.2 per cent in the same period. In the 
long term, the share directed to France, Italy and Germany ha~ not changed 
substantially.71 An analysis of changes in the distribution since 1987 shows few definite 
trends, but rather much variation. A large fall in Luxembourg's share has been offset by 
slight increases for France, Gern1any, Spain, Italy and Belgium. 
There are five main rea ons for the domination by the UK. 
70 JETRO (c), op. cit. , p. 7. 
71 Heitger and Stehn , op. cit., p. 3 and Ministry of Finance, Japan , op. cit., various editions. 
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• Fir t, English is the most comfortable foreign language for the Japanese. 
• Second, the government of the UK has been very receptive to Japanese investment. 
Thi is in contrast to the ambivalence or hostility that has been shown by other 
European countries. Attracting foreign investment has been high on the British 
political agenda since 1979 and the Invest in Britain Bureau, as well as regional, 
county and district promotion agencies have made energetic attempts to encourage 
Japanese manufacturing plants in Britain. Many of these agencies now have 
representatives located in Japan. The British government has also provided 
substantial financial inducement for Japanese investment.72 
• Third, because Britain is the financial centre of Europe and most Japanese investment 
has been concentrated in this sector, there has been a tendency to invest in the UK. 
• Fourth, the UK has relatively cheap labour costs, especially compared with 
Germany 73, and the workers tend to be of high quality. In addition, with high levels 
of unemployment in some regions, labour has been abundant. 
• Finally, the UK's wider industrial policy, increasingly neo-liberallaissez Jair, has made 
it ea ier for Japanese producers to enter the market place. 
72 Morris, op. cit., pp . 14- 15 . 
73 In 19 7, one Japanese producer aid that it was pay ing double the wage rates to its West German shop 
floor workers compared to it Welsh employees. ibid., p. 199 . 
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Inve tment in the Netherlands and Luxembourg has been out of proportion with their size 
(although the latter has suffered a large decrease). This is because they are also financial 
centres and in the case of Holland, English is widely understood. 
Investment in France, Italy and Germany is small relative to their economic size and is 
palily due to the language barriers; but in the case of France and Italy, also the less than 
welcoming response. The number of cases of investment in Germany is large, but the 
plants tend to be smaller and the amount of FDI is not large. On the positive side, 
Germany has good industrial infrastructure, a good industrial relations system, a high 
quality labour force and a central geographic position in Europe. However, these 
positive factors are outweighed by the high cost of labour, a shortage of labour and 
strong domestic competition.74 In 1988, Turner found that investment in Germany was 
largely in the distribution sector.75 
France with a large market, a central location and average labour costs has the potential 
to attract more Japanese investment. Turner's study found that investment in 
manufacturing in France was strong relative to other European destinations.76 
Spain ha been the main base for investment in the manufacturing sector due to its low 
costs of production and its high levels of protection.77 However, Spain and the other 
low co t countries within the EU do not command as large a share of Japanese FDI in 
Europe a might be expected. This is because their languages and cultures are not well 
74 'b 'd l l . 
75 Turner, op, cit" p, 31. 
76 'b 'd l l , 
77 Morri , op. cit., p, 200. 
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understood by Japanese investors, they are not central players in the EU, and their 
markets are not as wealthy as those of northern Europe. The industrial infrastructure and 
quality of labour are less developed than those in the UK. However, the figures are 
somewhat deceiving. Spain does claim a large and growing share of manufacturing 
investment. Because Inanufacturing investment forms a minor part of the Japanese FDI 
in Europe, its share seems relatively small. 
Other low cost countries in Europe (particularly those in Eastern Europe) have not been 
popular destinations for Japanese FDI largely because they are not members of the EU. 
In selling products made in these countries to the countries of the EU, the Japanese 
investor face the saIne tariffs and quotas as the rest of the world. Therefore there is no 
advantage in producing in Eastern Europe rather than South East Asia or South America 
where labour costs are also low. Eastern Europe also faces the problems of economic 
and political instability, and labour unaccustomed to the capitalist system. However, as 
Eastern Europe becomes more closely integrated with the countries of the EU, it will be a 
more popular destination for Japanese FDI. This is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
5.4 Intra-regional and intra-country division of labour 
Morris-Suzuki uses the 'intra-regional division of labour' model to describe the sectoral 
and geographic distribution of Japanese FDI in Asia. 78 This model can also be applied to 
Japane e FDI in Europe. 
The division of labour is repre ented by a pyranlidal struc'ture with several levels. 
Company operations in Japan are at the apex of the pyramid. At this level are the 
78 ibid. , p. lO. 
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company headquarters and management operations, research and development activities 
and production of high value added goods. At the base of the pyramid are the offshore 
manufacturing facilities of standardised and low value added goods. Initially South 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan occupied this position. However, as these economies have 
developed and production costs have increased, a three tier structure has developed, with 
Japan at the top, the NIEs on the second rung producing advanced manufactures, and the 
ASEAN countries at the base. 
The Asian region provides the best illustration of intra-regional division of labour. A 
similar pattern has developed in Europe, although it is not as well defined. Germany, 
with high costs of production, is targeted for more advanced manufactures and 
distribution. The lower cost countries of Spain, Portugal, Ireland and the UK form the 
base of the pyramid with manufacture of electronics and automobiles concentrated in 
these places. As the EU grows and comes to include countries of Eastern Europe, 
another tier will form. Just as Japanese investment in different sectors is directed to 
different regions of the world depending on their advantages and disadvantages, the 
diversified nature of the EU gives Japanese investors the opportunity to exploit the 
con1parative advantages of the different countries. 
Taking the 'intra-regional division of labour' model to its extreme, within the countries of 
Europe, certain regions have been more effective at attracting foreign investment. In the 
UK, peripheral regions, especially Wales, Scotland and north-east England, tend to 
donunate. The e regions have cheap abundant labour and the regional governments 
provide incentives and guidance. 
With about five per cent of the UK's population, Wales attracted one third of all UK 
inward inve tlnent project from Japan in 1993/94. The Welsh economy, traditionally 
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reliant on coal and steel, is shifting its focus to consumer electronics and service 
indu tries. With a well educated, flexible, hard-working, yet cheap labour force, Wales 
provide a relatively profitable investment destination within the UK and hence within the 
EU. 
In Germany and Spain there are clear locational patterns related to the factors that typify 
and motivate investment, such as the type of production and the availability of labour. 
Investment in France is not as concentrated as in other countries, but again depends on 
the availability of labour and government incentives.79 
5.5 Attitudes to direct investment in Europe and problems 
Japanese investment in Europe has clearly brought several advantages to the countries 
involved, but on the other hand has been widely criticised. Similarly, while the 
governments of some countries, particularly France, have been vocal in their opposition 
to Japanese investll1ent, other countries, and even regions within France, are cOll1peting 
all10ng themselves to attract Japanese funds. Japanese investment in Europe is less than 
that in the US, and American investment in Europe is still gre~ter than Japanese 
investment80 . Similarly, Japanese manufacturing companies in the EU still employ only 
100,000 people in total, only slightly more than the European workforce of IBM. 81 It is 
the rapid acceleration of Japanese investment, the dominance of Japanese companies in 
certain ectors, such as electronic and cars, and the success of these companies, that 
wonies European industrialists and politicians. 
79 ibid., pp. 201-2 . 
80 "The Battle for Europe" , p. 17. 
81 Morri ,op. cit., p. 196. 
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Japane e investment in Europe has been a politically sensitive topic. Particularly vocal 
against Japanese investment was former French Prime Minister Edith Cresson who said 
liThe Japanese have a strategy of world conquest. They have finished with their job in 
the US. Now they're about to devour Europe". 82 Many European companies have had 
to merge or have been squeezed out altogether because of Japanese FDI. Local content 
was the main focus of debate in the late 1980s. Strict local content rules have been 
imposed, as well as quotas and anti-dumping measures. For example, anti-dumping 
duties have been imposed on electronic typewriters and copiers due to concerns about the 
local content ratio. Governments have also given grants to European industries for 
research and development to make them more competitive.83 The French and Italians 
have been particularly against Japanese investment, although with a slowdown in the rate 
of increase of investment, these criticisms seem to have decreased in both frequency and 
vigour. Germany feels it can hold its own against the Japanese and there is less 
opposition in that country. 84 
On the other hand, Britain and Ireland have not only welcomed Japanese investment, but 
encouraged it. With recession and unemployment levels as high as 17 per cent in those 
countries, cash and technology are urgently needed. Japanese FDI is seen by the UK 
governluent as potentially the most dynamic and influential source of international 
inve tment. 85 Econonusts believe that Japanese manufacturing skill will diffuse into 
European industry. Some think that Japanese investment is crucial to Britain's 
82 "The Battle for Europe", p. l6 . 
83 ibid., p. l7. 
84 ·b·d l l . 
85 M· . 14 orns, op. Clt., p. . 
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manufacturing future. 86 National and regional governments offer incentives in the forn1 
of tax concessions and direct grants. 
For example, the Welsh Development Agency has made a concerted effort to attract 
overseas investment and develop industrial infrastructure. Senior government officials 
have visited Japan soliciting inward investment for Wales. 
Britain's attitude has brought criticism from others in Europe who see it as an 'aircraft 
carrier' for Japanese attacks. 87 For example, the local content of Nissan cars made in the 
UK ha been under review and has resulted in a series of trade rows between the UK, 
France and Italy. The difficulty is that once a car is made in the EU, it can, in theory, be 
sold without barriers in other EU countries, thus avoiding quotas in those with more 
protective policies. However, even in France, the most critical of all countries in the EU, 
the lure of Japanese money has been too hard to resist, and local authorities have looked 
to encourage Japanese investment. 88 
With the different countries having conflicting attitudes and the regions and countries 
con1peting for funds, the Japanese have been able to pay one <Iff against the other. Thus, 
it ha been difficult for the EU to develop a cornmon policy, thereby compounding the 
problem. 
86 "The Battle for Europe", p. 19. 
87 ibid., p. 21. 
88 This wa particularly noticeable at the 1993 Global Bu ine s Opportuniti es Con ention (GBOC) held 
in 0 aka, October 12-14. Many of the participants were there olely to encourage Japanese in vestment 
and appeared to spend a lot of money to try to achieve this through promotional material , offices in 
Japan, and various tax conce ions and grants offered to investors . There were tands from The 
Netherlands , Ireland, The Northern Development Board (UK), regions of France, Spain , Bel gi um , and 
Portugal . 
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In its report on trade and economic relations between the EC and Japan in December 
1992, the Committee on External Economic Relations stated the Commission's view on 
Japanese direct investment in the Union as follows: 
Japanese direct investment in the EC can make a useful contribution to industrial 
developme!lt and renewal provided that it is sufficiently integrated into the 
economic fabric of the Community and leads to 
i) the net creation of new jobs; 
ii) the progressive 'Europeanisation' of management; and 
iii) not merely the selective transfer of items of research and development to 
Europe, but ultimately also the establishment of autonomous, innovatory R&D 
centres in Europe, directed not only to regional but also to world markets. 89 
This view clearly reflects concerns of various members of the Union, and implicitly is 
encouraging global localisation of Japanese production in Europe. The report goes on to 
recommend that "member states should follow a common line towards the issue of 
inward investment"90, recognising that one of the Union's greatest problems has been that 
the different members have been competing among themselves for Japanese funds with no 
common policy aims. 
The alarmi t sentiments and criticism of Japanese investment in Europe has been a result 
of the large and rapid increase in the amount of Japanese FDI, extensive media coverage, 
much of it negative and focussing on certain sectors such as real estate, and the expan ion 
of Japan' econon1ic presence. In order to overcome these negative attitudes, successful 
J apane e companies have attempted to strengthen relations with the local communities by 
locali ing manufacturing re ources, such as using n10re locally produced parts and 
89 Moorhou e, J. , Report of the Committee on External Economic Relations 011 trade and ecollomic 
relations between the EC and Japan , December 1992, p. 11. 
90 ibid., p. 12. 
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employing local worker, and by having Japanese personnel fulfil social obligations and 
do volunteer work. To fully overcome the problem, it will be necessary to disseminate to 
the pu blic, information on the benefits of foreign investment. 
Not only are European companies finding it difficult to export to Japan and finding they 
have to compete with Japanese companies on their own territory, but it is difficult for 
them to invest within Japan. This is illustrated clearly in Table 6. While cumulative 
Japanese FDI amounted to $422.6 billion in 1993, the cumulative value of foreign direct 
inve tment in Japan was just $29.9 billion.91 (European investment is about 30 per cent 
of this amount.) Of this, 65 per cent was in the manufacturing sector with the remaining 
35 per cent in non-manufacturing industries. There is significant investment in 
technology and in research and development. 
FDI in Japan is unlikely to be profitable because of high production costs, and language 
and cultural barriers. Additionally, Japan has no special natural resources, industrial 
biases ( uch as the financial sector in the UK, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) or 
touri m hot pots (like Australia). Nonetheless, the sheer size of the imbalance makes the 
European companies critical. 
JETRO identifies "gaps in perception" as one of the main causes of the small level of 
foreign investn1ent in Japan. Given the perceived barriers to trade with Japan, perhaps 
foreign companies should follow Japan's lead and look to increasing their investment in 
Japan a a trategy for overconting these barrier . These cOlnpanies need to seek 
reciprocal access through bilateral and regional diplomacy. The challenge is to overcome 
the language and cultural barrier , and the high co t of production. This will not be an 
91 Kan ai Economic Federation, Japan Close-Up: Vie'rvsfrol11 Kansai, 09, eptember 1994, p. 39 . 
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ea y task. Another possibility, and one that Australia is pursuing aggressively, is for 
European companies to use Australia as a base from which to launch their businesses into 
Asia. 
Japan needs to improve both the investment environment and its image as a good place to 
invest. It is part of JETRO's work to do this. Just as the Japanese need not only to open 
their markets but also to show the world they are open, they need to encourage foreign 
investment. If they do not, the result will be increasing hostility as they attempt to 
increase their investment offshore. The Japanese government recognises this and has 
been trying to reduce the imbalance by offering foreign firms tax incentives and low 
interest, long-term finance through the Japanese Development Bank and the Export-
Import Bank of Japan.92 
The increased Japanese investment has also had implications for American companies in 
Europe. Not only have they had to compete with Japanese cOlnpanies at home, but they 
now face Japanese competition in a traditionally strong base.93 
92 'b'd l l . 
93 "The Battle for Europe" , pp . 16-7. 
-67-
Chapter 6 Prospects and Eastern Europe 
Chapter 6. Prospects for Japanese FDI in the EU and Eastern Europe 
6.1 Recession and recovery, and prospects for Japan's FDI 
Figure 1 and 3 showed the rapid rise of Japanese investment both in the world generally, 
but more particularly in Europe, until 1990. In the following three years there were 
succes ive falls in these flows as a result of the collapse of the 'bubble economy' and a 
sustained (and for the Japanese, deep) recession. Nonetheless, the amount of investment 
was still relatively strong and above pre-boom levels. It is the heady days of the late 
1980s that should be seen as 'irregular'; present levels are more sustainable. 
In 1993, Japanese FDI increased for the first time since 1989. The amount of $36.02 
billion wa an increase of 5.5 per cent on the previous year. Increases were registered in 
the United States, Europe and Asia. The Australia-Japan Econonuc Institute identified 
the renewed appreciation of the yen as the primary cause. The appreciation of the yen 
has been "prolonged and significant", negatively affecting the competitiveness of Japanese 
manufacturing industries and increasing the incentive for such companies to transplant 
operation offshore to lTIOre competitive locations. It is this factor that clearly explains 
both the increased inve tment in the electrical equipn1ent and general machinery sectors, 
and in that directed to China.94 
The economic recovery in Europe and the US has been an important factor in the 
increasing Japanese FDI in the tertiary sector. In particular, investment in finance grew 
a a re ult of increased inve tn1ents by clients in other industries and as a result of 
increa ed trade to the e indu trialised regions. 
94 Au tralia Japan Economic Institute, op. cit., p. 2. 
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This increase has happened despite corporate profitability in Japan remaining low. As 
Japane e companies fully recover from the collapse of the financial and real estate 
sector, they are likely to be more willing to invest overseas. The Australia Japan 
Economic Institute predicts that Japanese FDI will increase again next year as a result of 
increa ed corporate profitability and several other factors. They point out that 
"depreciation of the yen is unlikely; prospects for the stock market are brighter than in the 
past three years; low inflation is keeping interest rates steady; high economic growth is 
continuing in Asia, accelerating in the US and reappearing in parts of Europe; and the 
financial sectors will have to step up their investment to keep up with their customers in 
the production sectors "95. 
Access Economics forecast in 1991 that Japanese FDI is likely to continue at a high level 
even if the surplus of savings over investment declines, because of the low percentage of 
J apane e investment in overseas manufacturing and changing economic structure in 
Japan.96 
JETRO predicts that 
• there is unlikely to be a large outflow of capital from Japan, especially in the 
traditionally strong sectors such as electronics and auton1obiles, due to the increased 
competitiveness of western companies and the increased costs of procuring funds. 
• FDI in Europe and the US will be marked by its 'global localisation' strategies. For 
exaluple, more R&D facilities are being shifted offshore. 
95 ·b ·d 3 l l ., p. . 
96A E . . 1 cce conomlCS, op. cll., p. . 
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• inve tment by small and medium sized enterprises will be strong due to labour 
shortages and increasing wages in Japan, movements overseas by parent companies, 
and internationalisation strategies driven by reverse imports. 
• inve tment in Asia will continue to increase rapidly, especially in manufacturing 
sectors and to ASEAN and China, due to increased costs of production in Japan. The 
'intra-regional division of labour' will be strengthened as production of low value 
added products is moved offshore.97 
While many of these factors will not be as favourable for Europe as for low cost 
countries, prospects for Japanese FDI in Europe are still good. Japanese FDI in Europe 
was $7.9 billion in 1993. This was an increase of 12.4 per cent on the previous year, 
significantly more than the increase in Japanese FDI world-wide. Europe's share also 
increased, rising to 22 per cent. It is unlikely that investment will quickly return to the 
heights of the 'bubble economy' years. However, the amount of new investment is 
significantly more than investment in the pre-boom years. A noticeable trend is that 
Japanese businesses are now far more discerning with their money and less likely to invest 
indiscrinlinately. In some cases, the main Japanese contributions are confidence and 
technology rather than large injections of cash.98 
It has been uggested that Japanese investment in Europe will relnain steady, with 
adequate opportunity for small and mediun1- ized producers to set up overseas. With 
political and monetary union scheduled for 1999, there could be another boom around 
that time as the union is n10re trongly cemented.99 The decision to base the European 
97 JETRO (a), op. cit., pp. 82-89. 
98 "Japan to the Rescue", Fortune International, October 18 , 1993, p. 31. 
99 K ' . Imura, op. cit. 
-70-
Chapter 6 Prospects and Eastern Europe 
central bank in Germany could see Japanese investment there increase, given the high 
proportion of investment in the financial sectors. It will be interesting to follow changes 
in the amount of new and existing Japanese FDI in Europe and strategies adopted by 
companie , both external and internal. 
6.2 Problems with European unification and expansion 
European unification has not proceeded at all smoothly, with continuing conflict between 
member countries on the form of future cooperation. Particularly important were the 
refusal of Denmark to agree to the Maastrict Treaty in a national referendum in June 
1992 (although a second referendum produced agreement after Denmark was granted 
special status - see Footnote 41), and the collapse of the European Monetary System in 
1993. Thus, the whole situation is far less certain than it was at the time of Maastrict, 
and this could negatively impact on Japanese FDI. 
The EU has been expanding and diversifying in terms of the types of social and economic 
structures and level of economic development of the countries involved and, as discussed 
below, this trend is likely to continue. This has provoked dis~ussion as to how the Union 
should be progressed. As External Economic Relations Commissioner Brittan said, "You 
can't run a community of twenty or more in the saIne way you run a community of six. " 
With countries already as heterogeneous as Gern1any and Spain and the Union likely to 
be more diverse in the future, it is recognised that some sort of 'variable speed' approach 
need to be adopted. Countrie would move at different paces towards common 
objectives and eventual convergence. Such a concept has already found its recognition in 
the Maa trict Treaty itself, with provisions for EMU to come into effect for a core group, 
with the rest to follow . 
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Statement made by French Prime Minister Balladur and a discussion paper by the 
Christian Democrats Party in Germany have provoked much debate and some criticism. 
The German paper suggested that a hard core of Germany, France and the Benelux 
countries proceed faster than the rest. This resulted in protests from some of those not 
nominated for the fast track (especially the UK, Spain and Italy).100 
A diversified EU actually holds attractions for Japanese investors. They would be able to 
exploit the specific advantages of each country, as shown in the 'intra-regional division of 
labour model' in Chapter 5. 
6.3 Eastern Europe and an expanded EU 
The creation of a single European market has proved to be attractive to other European 
nations in respect to their participation in the EU. As mentioned earlier, Sweden, Finland 
and Austria joined the Union in 1995. Other countries have expressed an interest in 
taking part. As yet the European Commission is adopting a 'wait and see' approach. 
However, for political and ecurity reasons, it is expected that in the next ten to fifteen 
year the Union could be expanded to include the countries of Eastern Europe (Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic , Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria), some former Soviet 
Republics (Slovenia and the three Baltic States) and Mediterranean countries (Cyprus and 
Malta). 
Such an expanded market would make Europe all the n10re inviting for Japanese 
inve tment. These countries would also provide Japane e investors with a low-cost 
100 Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and ew Zealand, European Union News, 
Vol 12 No 7, OctoberlNovember 1994, p. 2. 
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region within the EU in which to produce. Thus an expansion of the EU is likely to 
produce an increase in the share of Japanese FDI directed to Europe. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of Central and Eastern European 
countries, it was expected that their new market economies would attract investment 
flows, especially frOIll Japan. Eastern Europe desperately needs investment funds as a 
means to reform its markets. The countries of Eastern Europe (especially Hungary, 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria) and the former Soviet Union have launched 
activities to attract western capital investment as a means of modernising their economies. 
They have done this by relaxing tight controls on foreign capital inflows, reforming laws 
on joint ventures and making it possible for 100 per cent ownership by foreign 
companies. There have been some joint ventures with Japan. IOl However, the Japanese, 
along with other investing countries l02, have been slow and unwilling to establish 
production bases in Eastern Europe (except in natural resource sectors). Reasons given 
include inadequate communication infrastructure, environmental problems, labour 
unfamiliar with the free market system I 03, controls on the movement of foreign 
companie ,continuing societal and econonuc confusion. In addition, the Japanese are not 
yet convinced of the attractiveness of the markets given the ri~ks involved in foreign 
investn1ent. 104 
Nonetheles , there are cases if Japanese investment in Eastern Europe. For example, 
Suzuki began production in Hungary in 1992. Although Japanese FDI is unlikely to 
101 JETRO (d), op. cit., p. 12. 
102 Flows of inve tment to Eastern Europe were 5 billion in 1993 . Brenchley, op. cit. 
103 Kimura, op. cit. 
104 JETRO (a), op. cit., p. 265. 
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increase quickly, because the countries of Eastern Europe are enthusiastic for Japanese 
funds there is likely to be steady growth in the near future, and undoubtedly great 
potential in the longer term. This potential competition for investment funds worries the 
struggling members of the EU, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece. l os 
6.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, Japanese investment in Europe grew rapidly in the late 1980s in line with 
the growth of Japanese FDI worldwide. Until that time, FDI in Europe was limited 
because the characteristics of the market and industrial structure made it less profitable 
and more risky than other destinations. Once the Japanese had made inroads into the 
American market and the Europeans began to encourage FDI, Europe became a more 
popular destination. However, the most important factor in the rapid growth was the 
formation of a single market and moves toward complete economic integration. Not only 
did the standardisation make it easier for the Japanese to do business, but there were fears 
that a protectionist 'Fortress Europe' would develop in response to rising trade deficits 
with Japan. This catalysed Japanese investment activities to establish themselves inside 
the barrier . 
The situation has created conflict in Europe with, on the one hand, the need for Japanese 
fund and expertise, and on the other, fears that local industries will be eliminated 
completely. At the height of the boom in the late 1980s, there was extreme criticisn1 by 
some in Europe not only of the Japanese, but al 0 the governments of other member 
nations which openly encouraged Japanese FDI. Howev~r, this criticism seems to have 
Ie ened omewhat in the la t eighteen month with a fall in the rate of investn1ent. With 
the collap e of the 'bubble economy', Japane e firms do not have the funds to invest a 
lOS ibid., p. 264. 
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widely overseas. Hence, there has been a decrease in the level of FDI generally, as well 
as in Europe. Although many of the large companies have already set up in Europe, there 
is significant scope for the expansion of small and medium-sized enterprises. If 
unification proceeds smoothly leading up to 1999, and particularly if the membership of 
the EU is expanded, Japanese FDI is likely to remain strong, without reaching the heights 
of the boom period. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Intensity of Trade - Japan, EECIEU and North America 
Importer Japan EEC/EU 
Exporter 
Japan 1975 0.29 
1992 0.46 
EEC/EU 1975 0.11 
1992 0.22 
North America 1975 l.22 0.50 
1992 1.41 0.40 
Australia 1992 4.12 
The intensity of trade is measured by the formula: 
(XijlXi)/(Mj/[W -Mi]) 
where Xij is country i's exports to country j 
Xi is country i's total exports 
Mj is country j's total imports 
W is world imports 









Sources: 1975 figures - Corbett, 1. , The European Community's Trade with Japan - Issues and 
Implications, Australia-Japan Economic Relations Research Project, Paper No. 48, Canberra, 1978, 
p. 16; 1992 fig ures - own calcu lations using IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1993. 
-76-
Japanese Foreign Direct In vestment in Europ e Appendices 
Appendix B 
Changes in Japanese FDI to the world, Europe and North America, 1986-1989 
World Europe North America 
Change Change Change Change Change Change 
on 1986- on 1986- on 1986-
Amount previous 1989 Amount previous 1989 Amount previous 1989 
I 
Year $USm year (%) (0/0 ) $USm year (%) (%) $USm year (0/0) (0/0 ) I 
1986 22,320 3,469 10,441 
1987 33,364 500/0 6,576 90% 15,357 47% 
1988 47 ,022 41 0/0 9,116 39% 22,328 45 0/0 
-
1989 67 ,540 44 0/0 2030/0 14,808 62 0/0 327% 33,902 52% 225% 
Source: own calculations using Mini stry of Finance, Japan, Financial Statistics of Japan , Tokyo, various editions. 
-77-
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Europe Appendices 
Appendix C 
Comparison of share of Japanese FDI in EU countries with their share of EU GDP 
Difference between 
GDP 1992 0/0 of total 0/0 of total Japanese share ofFDI and 
(US$ million) EUGDP FDI in EU, 1992 share ofGDP 
United Kingdom 1364 15.20/0 44.4 0/0 29.2% 
Netherlands 455 5.10/0 21.80/0 16.7 0/0 
Germany 2519 28.1% 11.60/0 -16.5% 
Luxembourg 15 0.2% 1.0% 0.8% 
France 1844 20.6% 6.90/0 -13.70/0 
Spain 710 7.9% 5.0% -2.9% 
Belgium 305 3.4% 4.2% 0.8% 
Italy 1470 16.40/0 3.3 % -13.1 0/0 
Ireland 66 0.7% 1.7% 1.00/0 
Portugal 110 1.2% 0.2% -1.00/0 
Greece 109 1.2% 0.0% -1.2% 
Total 8967 
---------- - - -- --- ----- - - - - -
Sources: own calculations using International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, Washington DC, 1993; Ministry of Finance, Japan, 
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Figure 2: Percentage Change in Stocks and Flows of Japanese 
FDI (relative to previous year) 
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Figure 3: Amount of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment, 
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Figure 5(a): Sectoral Distribution of Japanese FDI, 
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Figure 9: Necessary conditions for foreign direct investment 
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Figure 11a): Sectoral Distribution of Japanese FDI in 
Europe, JFY1991 
Branch 











Figure lIb): Sectoral distribution of Japanese FDI to 
Europe, 1981, 1985 and 1991 
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Table 1 
Flows and Stock of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment, 
JFY1970 - JFY1993 ($US billion) 
Flow Stock 
1970 n.a. 3.6 
1975 3.3 15.9 
1980 4.7 36.5 
1983 8.1 61.3 
1984 10.2 71.4 
1985 12.2 83.7 
1986 22.3 106.0 
1987 33.4 139.3 
1988 47.0 186.4 
1989 67.5 253.9 
1990 56.9 310.8 
1991 41.6 352.4 
1992 34.1 386.5 
1993 36.0 422.6 
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Table 2 
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment, by region, JFY1983 - JFY1993 
(percentage distribution) 
North America Europe Oceania Asia Latin America Middle East 
1983 33.2 12.2 2.3 22.7 23.1 2.1 
1984 34.9 19.1 1.5 16.0 22.6 2.7 
1985 45.0 15.8 4.3 11.7 21.4 0.4 
1986 46.8 15.5 4.4 10.4 21.2 0.2 
1987 46.0 19.7 4.2 14.6 14.4 0.2 
1988 47.5 19.4 5.7 11.8 13.7 0.6 
1989 50.2 21.9 6.8 12.2 7.8 0. 1 
1990 47.8 25.1 7.3 12.4 6.4 0.0 
1991 45.3 22.5 7.9 14.3 8.0 0.2 
1992 42.7 20.7 7.0 18.8 8.0 2.1 
1993 42.4 22.0 5.6 18.4 9.4 2.1 
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Table 3 
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment, by sector, JFY1983 - JFY1993 
(percentage distribution) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1951-92 
Manufacturing 31.8 24.7 19.3 17.1 23.5 29.4 24.1 27.2 29.6 29.5 30.9 26.9 
Electrical Appliances 6.2 4.0 4.2 4.4 7.3 6.5 6.6 10.0 5.5 5.3 7.7 6.3 
Transport 6.0 4.3 5.1 3.7 4.4 2.7 3.0 3.3 4.8 3.5 2.6 3.6 
Chemicals 5.5 2.2 1.1 1.6 2.7 2.7 3.1 4.0 3.9 5.9 4.8 3.8 
Non-Manufacturing 65.8 73.2 78.1 80.4 75.2 69.4 74.8 71.4 69.3 69.5 68.4 71.3 
Resou rces/ Agriculture 5. 1 5.3 5.3 3.3 1.9 2.7 2.2 2.7 3.3 4.4 3.0 5.6 
Commerce 14.3 14.6 12.7 8.3 6.8 6.8 7.6 10.8 12 .6 10.9 14.1 10.4 
Banking/Insurance 14.3 20.5 31. 1 32.4 32.0 27 .9 22.8 14.1 12.0 13.4 17 .8 19.4 
Services 7.6 6.7 5.4 7.0 8.3 7.9 15.7 19.8 13.0 19 .1 9.8 12.1 
Transport 16.7 16.3 10. 1 8.6 6.4 5.0 4.3 3.8 6.0 5.1 6.0 5.6 
Real Estate 4.6 4.2 9.9 17 .9 16.3 18.4 20.7 19.5 21.4 15.1 16.9 15 .5 
Other 3.2 I . I 3.6 2.9 3.5 0.7 1.5 0.7 1.0 1.5 0.8 2.7 
Branch Establishment 2.4 2.1 2.6 2.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.8 
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Table 4 
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Europe, JFY1975 - JFY1993 
($US billion and percentage of total Japanese FDI) 
Flow percent of total Stock percent of total 
1975 0.34 10.2% n.a n.a 
1980 0.58 12.30/0 n.a n.a 
1983 0.99 12.2% 7.2 11.7% 
1984 1.94 19.1 % 9.1 12.8% 
1985 1.93 15.8% 11.0 13.20/0 
1986 3.47 15.5% 14.5 13.7 0/0 
1987 6.58 19.7% 21.1 15.1 0/0 
1988 9.12 19.40/0 30.2 16.20/0 
1989 14.81 21.9 0/0 45.0 17 .7% 
1990 14.29 25.1 % 59.3 19.1 % 
1991 9.37 22.5 % 68.7 19.5% 
1992 7.06 20.70/0 75.7 19.6% 
1993 7.94 22.00/0 83.7 17.8% 
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Table 5 
Japanese-affiliated Companies in the EU, August 1991 












United Kingdom 772 
Total 2,298 
Table 6 
Foreign Direct Investment in Japan 
($US billion) 
Flow Stock 
1987 2.2 9.6 
1988 3.2 12.8 
1989 2.9 15.7 
1990 2.8 18.5 
1991 4.3 22.8 
1993 n.a. 29.9 
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